FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCING—WHAT WAS CONGRESS SMOKING? THE UNCERTAIN DISTINCTION BETWEEN  COCAINE  AND  COCAINE BASE  IN THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986 by Stone, Spencer A.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 30 30 (2007-2008)





WAS CONGRESS SMOKING? THE
UNCERTAIN DISTINCTION BETWEEN
"COCAINE" AND "COCAINE BASE" IN THE
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986
Spencer A. Stone
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Spencer A. Stone, FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCING—WHAT WAS CONGRESS SMOKING? THE UNCERTAIN DISTINCTION
BETWEEN "COCAINE" AND "COCAINE BASE" IN THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986, 30 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 297 (2007),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss1/13
FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCING-WHAT WAS CONGRESS 
SMOKING? THE UNCERTAIN DISTINCTION BETWEEN "COCAINE" 
AND "COCAINE BASE" IN THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986 
INTRODUCTION 
Amid a flurry of media attention, the topic of federal crack 
cocaine sentencing has recently been the subject of major policy 
changes.1 In May 2007, the U.S. Sentencing Commission issued a 
report, encouraging Congress to lessen the disparity between the 
statutory mandatory minimum sentences for "crack" and powder 
cocaine.2 In the same month, the Commission promulgated an 
amendment to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, reducing the sen­
tence length for crack cocaine offenses.3 In addition, on December 
10, 2007, the Supreme Court held that a "judge may consider the 
disparity between the Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder 
cocaine offenses" in reaching sentencing decisions.4 Despite all of 
this activity and despite pressure on Congress,S the statute upon 
which all of these recent developments are based has remained un­
changed since its passage in 1986.6 This Note discusses a circuit 
split involving the definition of key terms in that statute. 
1. See The Sentencing Project, National Media Spotlight on Crack Cocaine, 
http://www.sentencingproject.orglNewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=535 (last visited Jan. 5, 
2008) (compiling recent press coverage on the subject). 
2. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FED. 
ERAL SENTENCING POLICY 8 (2007) [hereinafter USSC 2007 REP.]. The Commission's 
recommendation is consistent with its position taken in previous reports to Congress. 
{d. at 7-8. 
3. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28,558, 28,571-73 
(May 21, 2007) (amending U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1 [hereinaf­
ter USSG]); see also Solomon Moore, Rules Lower Prison Terms in Sentences for 
Crack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at A16, available at 2007 WLNR 21632155 (Westlaw); 
infra Part III.D (describing the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as they relate to cocaine 
sentences). 
4. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007). 
5. See, e.g., USSC 2007 REP., supra note 2, at 7-8 (urging Congress to decrease 
the disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences); ACLU Joins Representative 
Jackson-Lee's Call for Sentencing Fix, U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 18,2007, available at 2007 
WLNR 25015583 (Westlaw) ("The ACLU also urged Congress to support Rep. Jack­
son-Lee's recently introduced legislation ... [that] would eliminate sentencing dispari­
ties between crack and powder cocaine ...."); see also Drug Sentencing Reform and 
Cocaine Kingpin Trafficking Act of 2007, H.R. 4545, 1l0th Congo (2007) (text of Repre­
sentative Jackson-Lee's bill). 
6. 21 U.S.c. § 841 (2000). 
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In 1970, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting the distribu­
tion of, and possession with the intent to distribute, controlled sub­
stances.? The penalties and mandatory minimum sentences for this 
offense are enumerated in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (1986 
Act),8 and vary depending on the quantity and type of substance 
7. Id. § 841(a). 
8. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. The perti­
nent portion of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 is contained within Subtitle A of Title 
1, which is entitled Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3207, 
3207-2. The section of the Act under discussion throughout this Note is section 1002, 
which is codified at 21 u.s.c. § 841(b). The pertinent text of § 841 reads: 
(a) Unlawful acts 

... [I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally­
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to man­
ufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance .... 
(b) Penalties 
... [A]ny person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced 
as follows: 
(1)(A) In the case of violation of subsection (a) of this section involving­
(ii) 5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a de­
tectable amount of­
(1) coca leaves ... ; 
(II) cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of 
isomers; [ or] 
(III) ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers; or 
(iii) 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance described in clause 
(ii) which contains cocaine base; 
[S]uch a person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not 
be less than 10 years or more than life .... 
(B) In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving­
(ii) 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detect­
able amount of­
(I) coca leaves ... ; 
(II) cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of 
isomers; [or] 
(III) ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of 
isomers; or 
(iii) 5 grams or more of a mixture or substance described in clause 
(ii) which contains cocaine base; 
[S]uch a person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not 
be less than 5 years and not more than 40 years .... 
21 U.S.C. § 841. 
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involved.9 For a violation involving five or more grams of "cocaine 
base," an offender is subject to the same five-year mandatory mini­
mum as a person convicted of a similar offense involving five hun­
dred grams of "cocaine" or "its salts."l0 Similarly, an offense 
involving fifty grams of a substance containing "cocaine base" has 
the same ten-year mandatory minimum as that for five thousand 
grams of "cocaine" or "its salts."ll As such, under the federal sen­
tencing regime, sentences for "cocaine base" offenses average three 
to eight times longer than for a similar quantity of powder 
cocaine.12 
Cocaine is a substance derived from the coca plant,13 which 
produces both euphoric and stimulant effects in humansY In its 
naturally occurring form, cocaine is chemically basic,15 and conse­
quently there is no scientific or chemical difference between "co­
9. 21 U.S.c. § 841(b). 
10. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B). 
11. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
12. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 145 (1995) [hereinafter USSC 1995 REP.], available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/crack/EXEC.HTM. Until November 2007, it took one hundred 
times more powder cocaine than cocaine base to incur a similar sentence length. This 
ratio does not indicate, however, that the average sentence for cocaine base is 100 times 
longer than that for a powder cocaine offense. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, at iv-v (2002) 
[hereinafter USSC 2002 REP.], available at http://www.ussc.gov/r30ngress/02crack/ 
2002crackrpt.pdf ("[I]n 2000 the average sentence for a crack cocaine offense was 44 
months longer than the average sentence for a powder cocaine offense."). The U.S. 
Sentencing Commission recently amended the Sentencing Guidelines to lessen the 
sentences for "cocaine base" offenses, effective November 1, 2007. Sentencing Guide­
lines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28,558, 28,571-73 (May 21, 2007) (amending 
USSG § 2D1.1). Under the new amendment, "cocaine base" offenses are punished by 
a term of imprisonment of approximately two to five times longer than that for a similar 
amount of powder cocaine. Id.; see also Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 569 
(2007). Consequently, the average sentence length for such offenses is sure to change. 
In addition, the Commission recently determined that the new amendment is to be 
applied retroactively, thereby giving previously sentenced offenders the opportunity to 
move for a reduction in prison term. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 
73 Fed. Reg. 217, 219 (Jan. 2, 2008) (amending USSG § 1B1.10); see also Sentencing 
Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 58,345, 58,345-46 (Oct. 15, 2007); 
Harlan Protass, Op-Ed., Closing Crack's 100-1 Ratio, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2,2007, at 29, 
available at 2007 WLNR 21638045 (Westlaw). Note, however, that the amendment 
does not affect the statutory mandatory minimum sentences. 
13. PAUL M. GAHLINGER, ILLEGAL DRUGS: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THEIR HIS­
TORY, CHEMISTRY, USE, AND ABUSE 241 (2004). 
14. Id. at 253. 
15. The term "basic" is used throughout this work as an adjective describing a 
substance that exhibits the chemical properties of a base (as opposed to meaning simple 
or primitive). WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 181 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., unabr. ed. 1976) (defining basic as 
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caine" and "cocaine base."16 If, "[t]o a scientist, 'cocaine' and 
'cocaine base' are synonymous,"17 what then is the distinction Con­
gress intended between the two terms in 21 U.S.C. § 841 ?18 This is 
the question that this Note will seek to answer. 
The federal courts of appeals are split as to the appropriate 
resolution to this issue. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Tenth 
Circuits take a plain-meaning approach, holding that "cocaine 
base" is any substance containing the basic form of chemical co­
caine.19 On the other hand, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits hold that Congress intended the term "cocaine 
base" to mean only crack cocaine.20 Finally, the Ninth and D.C. 
Circuits take a hybrid approach, holding that "cocaine base" means 
anything made of cocaine that exhibits basic properties and can be 
smoked.21 
The case of Louis Humberto Barbosa22 will help to illustrate 
the implications of the circuit split: In July 1998, Mr. Barbosa swal­
lowed 882 grams of plastic-wrapped pellets in Aruba.23 He then 
"of, relating to, or characteristic of a base ... containing or involving the use of alkaline 
material"); see infra Part l.B (discussing the chemical properties of cocaine). 
16. United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488, 490-91 (7th Cir. 1995). 
17. /d. 
18. A similar issue exists in the interpretation of 21 U.S.c. § 844(a) for simple 
possession of a controlled substance (i.e., possession without the intent to distribute), 
which provides that, "a person convicted ... for the possession of a mixture or sub­
stance which contains cocaine base shall be imprisoned not less than 5 years and not 
more than 20 years," if the quantity of the substance is greater than five grams for a first 
conviction, three grams for a second conviction, and one gram for a third or subsequent 
conviction. However, because the vast majority of federal controlled substance prose­
cutions are commenced under § 841, and because the same terminology is used in both 
§ 844 and § 841, § 844 is only mentioned briefly here. Cf BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS­
TICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004, at 61 tb1.4.1 (2004), availa­
ble at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf(showingthat.in 2004, there were 
28,472 defendants charged in federal court with drug "trafficking" and only 1997 with 
"possession"). 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 427 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 2005), affd, 219 F. 
App'x 20 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 06-12032, 2007 WL 1833562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 
2007); United States v. Barbosa (Barbosa II), 271 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2001); United States 
v. Palacio, 4 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Butler, 988 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir. 1992). 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Crawford, 83 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Levy, 904 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1990). 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991). But see infra note 191 (discussing the lack 
of clarity in the D.C. Circuit's holding). 
22. Barbosa II, 271 F.3d 438. 
23. Id. at 444. 
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traveled to a hotel in Philadelphia where he "expelled" the pel­
lets.24 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officers arrested him for 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in vio­
lation of 21 U.S.c. § 841(a).25 The pellets that he swallowed were 
composed of eighty-five percent cocaine.26 Mr. Barbosa was in­
dicted for possession of more than fifty grams of cocaine base with 
intent to distribute under 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).27 It is clear 
from the facts adduced at trial that Mr. Barbosa was not in posses­
sion of crack cocaine,28 but rather a less concentrated form of 
cocaine.29 
This set of facts illustrates why this issue is practically impor­
tant. If "cocaine base" under the statute is defined exclusively as 
crack, as this Note argues, Mr. Barbosa would be subject to the 
five-year mandatory minimum for possession of more than five 
hundred grams (but less than five kilograms) of "cocaine" under 21 
U.S.c. § 841(b )(1)(B)(ii).30 On the other hand, if "cocaine base" 
means any form of cocaine that exhibits basic properties, as the 
court found in Barbosa's case,31 he would be subject to the ten-year 
mandatory minimum for possession of more than fifty grams of "co­
caine base" under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).32 Thus, an offense carrying a 
24. Id. 
25. Id. Unbeknownst to Mr. Barbosa, the person to whom he was to deliver the 
pellets in Philadelphia was an undercover informant for the DEA. Id. at 446-47; see 
also United States v. Barbosa (Barbosa J), 51 F. Supp. 2d 597,599-600 (E.D. Pa. 1999) 
(mem.) (describing the factual setting in more detail), affd, 271 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2001). 
26. Barbosa II, 271 F.3d at 460. 
27. Id. at 447-48. 
28. Barbosa I, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 602. 
29. Id.; cf GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 250 (crack contains ninety-five percent 
cocaine, powder cocaine contains ninety percent cocaine, and coca paste contains 
twenty to eighty-five percent cocaine). 
30. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Crawford, 83 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Levy, 904 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1990). 
31. Barbosa II, 271 F.3d at 467. 
32. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 427 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 2005), affd, 219 F. 
App'x 20 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 06-12032, 2007 WL 1833562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 
2007); Barbosa II, 271 F.3d at 438; United States v. Palacio, 4 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Butler, 988 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 
1549 (10th Cir. 1992). This explanation does not consider the potential sentencing in­
creases, which are beyond the scope of this Note. For example, a second violation in­
volving greater than five grams of "cocaine base" or five hundred grams of cocaine or 
its salts is punishable by a minimum term of ten years imprisonment; for subsequent 
offenses, or if death or serious injury results, the minimum term is increased to twenty 
years. 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2000). Similarly, a second violation involving greater 
than fifty grams of "cocaine base" or five kilograms of cocaine or its salts is punishable 
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five-year sentence in the Third Circuit may be punished by only 
probation or a short prison sentence in the Seventh Circuit.33 
As can be seen from Mr. Barbosa's case, the proper definition 
of "cocaine base" is of practical import to the criminal justice sys­
tem, and has direct implications for any number of federal judges, 
attorneys, and drug offenders. As such, this Note will attempt to 
provide a workable solution to the problem, arguing that the term 
"cocaine base" in 21 U.S.c. § 841(b) should be defined as crack 
cocaine, and only crack cocaine. As will be made clear, this is the 
only interpretation that respects the intent of Congress, the text of 
the statute, and the established tenets of statutory interpretation. 
In order to reach this conclusion, it is important to understand 
the history and chemistry of cocaine. Therefore, Part I of this Note 
will explore how cocaine travels from the fields of South America 
to consumers in the United States. It will also discuss the chemical 
properties and pharmacology of cocaine and crack. Part II will give 
some background on the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, including 
its legislative history and the general atmosphere in which it was 
passed. Part III will explore the circuit split, outlining more fact 
patterns in which the issue arises and the reasoning of the different 
courts. Finally, Part IV will analyze the legislative history of the 
1986 Act and the different arguments expounded by the circuits. 
This section will argue that the courts holding that "cocaine base" 
means any basic form of cocaine reach the incorrect conclusion. 
Additionally, Part IV will show why the reasoning of the courts us­
ing the "smokeability" test is likewise flawed. Finally, this Note will 
illustrate that a definition of "cocaine base" as meaning only crack 
cocaine is the best approach because it achieves what Congress in­
tended and respects the text of the statute.34 
by a minimum term of twenty years imprisonment; for subsequent offenses, the mini­
mum term is increased to a "mandatory term of life imprisonment." Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
33. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Similarly, an offense carrying a 
ten-year prison sentence in the Third Circuit may only carry a five-year sentence, or 
shorter, in the Seventh Circuit. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Additional 
implications of this issue are discussed in Part IV, infra. 
34. For opposing views, see generally Andrew C. MacNally, Comment, A Func­
tionalist Approach to the Definition of "Cocaine Base" in § 841,74 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 
(2007), and Amanda D. Cary, Comment, Cocaine Base: Not All It's Cracked Up to Be, 
40 U.c. DAVIS L. REV. 531 (2006). 
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1. COCAINE AND CRACK35 
Cocaine has been in use in different parts of the world for hun­
dreds of years.36 Its history, manufacturing process, and effects on 
the human body are the focus of a large body of scholarly work?7 
and a general knowledge of these subjects is integral to understand­
ing the relevant portions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 
Consequently, this Note begins with a discussion of the drug­
cocame. 
A. History of Cocaine 
The Native Americans of the Andes region believed that coca 
was a gift from the gods brought to earth by the first Incan emperor 
to help them cope with hardships of living in the cold, high altitude 
of the Andean plains.38 Incas living during the Middle Ages 
chewed the leaves of the coca plant together with ground-up sea­
shells to ward off hunger, combat fatigue, and produce a mild 
high,39 similar to the way modern Americans use caffeine.40 
However, it was not until the mid-1800s that the virtues of co­
caine became widely known outside of South America, thanks to 
the efforts of botanist and president of England's Royal Society, Sir 
Joseph Banks.41 Soon after bringing the coca plant to England, co­
caine became prized as a medical miracle by the most respected 
individuals of the time, including statesmen, popes, and physi­
cians.42 Over the years, cocaine has been used in all types of prod­
ucts including red wines, cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, and Coca­
Cola.43 It was prescribed as an anesthetic and to combat everything 
35. To avoid potential confusion, precise terminology will be used throughout the 
remainder of this Note to refer to the different forms of cocaine. "Cocaine base" will 
only be used in referring to the statutory text; "cocaine" will be used only to refer all 
forms of cocaine (including, but not limited to, cocaine paste, powder cocaine, and 
crack); when referring to a specific type of cocaine, such as crack or powder cocaine, the 
precise term will be used. 
36. GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 37. 
37. See, e.g., STEVEN B. KARCH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF COCAINE (1998); SIGMUND 
FREUD, UBER COCA (1884), reprinted and translated in SIGMUND FREUD, COCAINE PA­
PERS 47 (Robert Byck ed., Steven A. Edminster & Fredrick C. Redlich trans., 1975); 
Dangers of Cocaine, 27 JAMA 1018 (1896), reprinted in 276 JAMA 1614 (1996). 
38. GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 37-38. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 251. 
41. KARCH, supra note 37, at 11-12. 
42. GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 39. These individuals included Thomas 
Edison, Ulysses S. Grant, Pope Leo XIII, and Sigmund Freud. Id. 
43. Id. at 39-40. 
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from allergies, to prostate enlargement, and ironically, morphine 
addiction.44 
By the end of the nineteenth century, cocaine's addictive quali­
ties and adverse health effects were starting to be realized.45 This 
resulted in the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, requir­
ing accurate labeling of the contents of remedies and limiting the 
distribution of cocaine.46 Finally, in 1914 Congress banned non­
medical use of cocaine with the Harrison Act, which required all 
persons or entities engaged in the sale or importation of cocaine to 
register with the federal government.47 
Cocaine is currently classified as a Schedule II controlled sub­
stance.48 This classification indicates that while it has a high poten­
tial for abuse and addiction, cocaine also has legitimate medical 
uses, and is therefore not entirely outlawed in the United States.49 
Today, the primary medical use for cocaine is as a local anesthesia 
in nasal procedures. 50 
44. 	 KARCH, supra note 37, at 40. See generally FREUD, supra note 37. 
45. 	 See Dangers of Cocaine, supra note 37. The article notes: 
The recent death of a patient in a physician's operating room from the 
effects of cocaine again calls attention to the dangers attending the use of this 
drug.... 
We feel at this time that a note of warning is needed regarding the use of 
cocaine. It should never be prescribed or used by any but qualified medical 
practitioners. 
ld. 
46. 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768; see also GAHLINGER, 
supra note 13, at 42-43. 
47. Harrison Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). The Act also prohibited dispensing 
cocaine without either a prescription or permission of the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue. ld. 
48. 	 21 U.S.c. § 812(c) (2000). 
49. 	 Id. § 812(b)(2). 
50. Robert L. Martensen, From Papal Endorsement to Southern Vice, 276 JAMA 
1615, 1615 (1996). Additional legal medical uses of cocaine include use as a topical 
anesthetic for children (as it is less frightening and painful than an injection) and to 
control chronic pain in terminal illness. GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 246-47. Because 
crack cocaine is a modern invention, its history is shorter and involves mostly the evolu­
tion of cocaine's manufacturing process. STEVEN R. BELENKO, CRACK AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF ANTI-DRUG POLICY 6 (1993). As such, a discussion of the history of 
crack in particular, will be left to the explanation of chemistry and manufacturing. See 
infra Part LB. 
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B. Chemistry and Manufacturing 
Cocaine is a naturally occurring substance with a chemical 
formula of C17H21N04.51 It is derived from the coca plant, which is 
primarily grown in the Andes Mountains,52 the leaves of which con­
tain less than two percent cocaine.53 In this natural form, cocaine is 
chemically basic,54 meaning that it has a pH level greater than 
seven,55 and when combined with an acid, it creates a salt.56 To 
extract the cocaine from the coca leaves, they are dried and then 
ground together with an alkali (such as lime), an organic solvent 
(usually kerosene), and water.57 This process creates what is known 
as "coca paste" or "cocaine paste."58 
Before exportation, the coca paste is usually converted into co­
caine hydrochloride, a salt.59 This is accomplished by dissolving the 
coca paste in hydrochloric acid and water.60 Unbeknownst to many 
users of "cocaine," the substance they are snorting is not pure co­
caine; rather, it is cocaine hydrochloride, a salt more commonly 
known as powder cocaine, with the chemical formula of 
C17H21N04HC1.61 While the most common illegal use of cocaine 
51. THE MERCK INDEX: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHEMICALS, DRUGS, AND BIO­
LOGICALS § 2480, at 429-30 (Maryadele J. O'Neil et al. eds., 13th ed. 2001). This 
formula indicates that one cocaine molecule is composed of seventeen carbon atoms, 
twenty-one hydrogen atoms, one nitrogen atom, and four oxygen atoms. THEODORE L. 
BROWN ET AL., CHEMISTRY: THE CENTRAL SCIENCE 10, 47 (8th ed. 2000) (1977) 
(describing the abbreviations for particular elements and how to read chemical 
formulas). 
52. Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, Drug Facts: Cocaine, http:// 
www.ondcp.gov/drugfact/cocaine (last visited Apr. 22, 2007). 
53. GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 250. 
54. United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 1995); THE MERCK INDEX, 
supra note 51, § 2580, at 248l. 
55. BROWN ET AL., supra note 51, at 602. 
56. Id. at 117. 
57. Booker, 70 F.3d at 490; GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 249. 
58. GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 249. At this point the substance is still basic. 
Id. While coca paste is used as a narcotic in other parts of the world, this is generally 
not the case in the United States. BELENKO, supra note 50, at 5. 
59. At this point it is no longer a base. BROWN ET AL., supra note 51, at 117. 
60. Booker, 70 F.3d at 490; GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 249-50. 
61. THE MERCK INDEX, supra note 51, § 2480, at 430; see also Booker, 70 F.3d at 
490. This chemical formula is the same as that of cocaine, see supra note 51 and accom­
panying text, with the addition of an atom of hydrogen and one of chlorine. See 
BROWN ET AL., supra note 51, at 10, 47 (describing how to read a chemical formula). 
The addition of these atoms converts the substance from a base into a pH-neutral salt. 
Id. at 117. 
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hydrochloride is intranasal administration (i.e., snorting), it can also 
be ingested orally or injected intravenously.62 
Cocaine hydrochloride, however, cannot be smoked.63 This is 
because the chemical decomposes and breaks down at a tempera­
ture lower than that required to vaporize it.64 In other words, when 
cocaine hydrochloride is heated, it is no longer cocaine by the time 
it becomes a vapor.6S Thus, in order to smoke cocaine, it must be 
converted back into a base, which can be vaporized without decom­
posing.66 There are two primary ways to accomplish this task. In 
the 1970s, it was generally done by heating cocaine hydrochloride in 
water and adding ammonia.67 Ether was then added, and the solu­
tion shaken.6s The pure cocaine would combine with the ether and 
separate out from the rest of the mixture.69 This method of creating 
what has become known as "freebase" is very dangerous. Because 
ether is highly flammable, any attempt to smoke the mixture can 
literally blowup in one's faceJo 
However, thanks to the illegal drug industry's ingenuity, a new 
method to create freebase cocaine was discovered in the early 
1980s.71 By this new process, powder cocaine hydrochloride is dis­
solved in water and baking soda and then boiledJ2 When all the 
water evaporates, the residue is broken into rocks, each represent­
62. USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at 18; see also Dorothy K. Hatsukami & 
Marian W. Fischman, Crack Cocaine and Cocaine Hydrochloride: Are the Differences 
Myth or Reality?, 276 JAMA 1580, 1582 (1996). 
63. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 62, at 1582. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. Smoking cocaine hydrochloride would be like trying to eat an apple after 
two months in a compost heap; it simply would no longer be an apple. 
66. Id. The base must be freed from the salt, from whence comes the term 
"freebase cocaine." Crack is one type of freebase cocaine. Booker, 70 F.3d at 491. 
67. GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 243. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. 243-44. 
70. See, e.g., Associated Press, Richard Pryor in Critical Condition After Explo­
sion of Drug Mixture, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1980, available at 1980 WLNR 178027 
(Westlaw) (describing Pryor's trip to the hospital after attempting to smoke freebase 
cocaine, which exploded in his face). 
71. Jeffrey Fagan & Ko-lin Chin, Violence as Regulation and Social Control in the 
Distribution of Crack, in NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., DRUGS AND VIOLENCE: CAUSES, CORRELATES, AND CONSEQUENCES 
8, 18 (Mario De La Rosa et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter DRUGS AND VIOLENCE], availa­
ble at http://www.drugabuse.gov/pdflmonographs/103.pdf; see BELENKO, supra note 50, 
at 6 ("[CJrack made one of its earliest entries in the United States in Miami sometime in 
the early 1980s."). 
72. USSC 2002 REp., supra note 12, at 16. 
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ing a single, smokeable dose.73 The new process is easier, safer, and 
substantially cheaper than the old method of creating freebase co­
caine, and results in a substance that has become known as 
"crack."74 Using this method, one gram of powder cocaine will re­
sult in 0.89 grams of crack, almost a one-to-one relationship.75 Re­
gardless of the method used to free the base, either process results 
in the creation of a basic substance with a chemical formula of 
C17H 21N04.76 
C. Supply Chain, Patterns of Abuse, and Effects 
Grown along the west coast of South America, approximately 
two-thirds of the world's supply of cocaine comes from Columbia, 
with virtually all of the remainder originating in Bolivia and Peru.77 
"[C]artels control the movement of coca leaf and paste from the 
jungles of Bolivia and Peru to the ... laboratories in southern Co­
lumbia," where it is ultimately converted into powder cocaine.78 
Cocaine is generally imported into the United States as cocaine hy­
drochloride through the Caribbean Islands and Mexico.79 If de­
sired, the powder is then converted into crack cocaine in the United 
States.80 
In 2000, roughly equal numbers of federal cocaine cases in­
volved cocaine hydrochloride and crack cocaine,81 and federal co­
caine cases (both powder and "cocaine base") have consistently 
represented about half of all federal drug cases.82 Cocaine is highly 
73. Id. A dose of crack cocaine generally weighs from one-tenth to one-half 
gram. Id. 
74. GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 24S. The term "crack" is derived from the 
popping sound made when the rocks are heated. Id. at 244. 
7S. USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at 16-17. The dosages of powder cocaine and 
crack are likewise similar: one gram of powder cocaine yields five to ten doses, and one 
gram of crack cocaine yields between two and ten doses. Id. at 17. 
76. This is the chemical formula of pure cocaine. See supra note S1. 
77. NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 
2007, at 3 (2006), available at http://www.dea.gov/concern/18862/2007.pdf. 
78. GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 248. 
79. Id. 
80. Cf BELENKO, supra note SO, at 109 ("[Clrack-dealing organizations arose by 
purchasing quantities of powdered cocaine from dealers and then producing and selling 
crack."). 
81. USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at 32-33. It should also be noted that crack 
cocaine offenses have been steadily increasing each year, while powder cocaine offenses 
have been decreasing. Id. 
82. Id. at 32. The vast majority of crack cocaine offenders have consistently been 
black: 91.4% in 1992 and 84.7% in 2000, whereas white offenders accounted for only 
3.2% in 1992 and S.6% in 2000. Id. at 63. On the other hand, in 1992,32.3% of powder 
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addictive in any form, but studies show that injecting cocaine hy­
drochloride and smoking freebase cocaine (including crack) result 
in higher potential for abuse than intranasal administration.83 This 
is primarily because smoking and intravenous injection allow the 
chemical to reach the brain more rapidly than snorting.84 Users of 
all forms of cocaine are likely to abuse other drugs, but crack co­
caine users are more likely to abuse a wider variety of illegal drugs 
than users of powder cocaine.85 In addition, using cocaine in any 
form is more likely to result in a trip to the hospital than any other 
illicit drug,86 but more cocaine-related deaths are associated with 
injection of cocaine hydrochloride than with smoking crack co­
caine.87 While it is unlikely for violence to directly result from the 
pharmacological effects of any form of cocaine,88 violence does re­
sult from social and economic factors involved in the cocaine trade 
and culture.89 These factors are more prevalent in populations us­
ing crack cocaine, and therefore crack users are often more likely to 
participate in violence than users of other drugs, including users of 
powder cocaine.90 
cocaine offenders were white, 27.2% were black, and 39.8% were Hispanic; and in 2000, 
17.8% of powder cocaine offenders were white, 30.5% were black, and 50.8% were 
Hispanic. Id. In 2000, 90.1 % of crack cocaine offenders were male, and 86.2% of pow­
der cocaine offenders were male; the average crack offender was twenty-nine years old, 
and the average powder cocaine offender was thirty-four. Id. 
83. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 62, at 1583; see also USSC 2002 REP., 
supra note 12, at 19. 
84. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 62, at 1583. 
85. Id. at 1584. 
86. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DRUG ABUSE 
WARNING NETWORK, 2005: NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF DRUG-RELATED EMERGENCY 
DEPARTMENT VISITS 22 fig.1 (2006), available at http://dawninfo.samhsa.gov/files/ 
DAWN-ED-2005-Web.pdf. In 2005, of the 1,449,154 drug-related trips to hospital 
emergency departments, 448,481 were cocaine-related. This is nearly twice as many 
visits as those related to the second-place drug, marijuana. Id. at 20 tbl.2. 
87. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 62, at 1584. However, several studies 
have "show[n] a higher percentage of crack-cocaine smokers needing hospitalization 
than users of cocaine hydrochloride." [d. Users of smoked freebase cocaine also gen­
erally suffer from more psychiatric disorders than those who use cocaine hydrochloride 
(either nasally or by injection). [d. 
88. [d. at 1585. 
89. These factors include systemic violence, directly resulting from the cocaine 
trade and territorial disputes between dealers, Fagan & Chin, supra note 71, at 12, and 
economically-induced violence, resulting from attempts to make money for the 
purchase of drugs (through muggings and property-related crimes). Steven L. Brody, 
Violence Associated with Acute Cocaine Use in Patients Admitted to a Medical Emer­
gency Department, in DRUGS AND VIOLENCE, supra note 71, at 44, 44. 
90. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 62, 1585. 
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To summarize, the data show that both powder and crack 
forms of cocaine are the cause of great problems for American soci­
ety and its justice system. Crack cocaine may more often lead to 
injury, violence, and addiction, but the studies appear to be some­
what lacking in proving these statistics.91 While there are differ­
ences between the physical, mental, and societal effects of the 
different forms of cocaine, these differences may not be as signifi­
cant as commonly believed.92 
II. 	 COCAINE, CRACK, AND THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT 
OF 1986 
In order to address the problems associated with drug use and 
abuse in the United States, Congress enacted "the most far-reach­
ing drug law ever passed."93 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was 
an omnibus bill of 192 pages,94 and fifteen individual titles,95 deal­
ing with a wide variety of drug-related topics, including the mini­
mum penalties for federal cocaine offenses.96 
A. Setting the Stage 
President Richard Nixon officially initiated the "war on drugs" 
shortly after taking office in 1969.97 Soon thereafter, Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
91. See generally id. (noting that there is little evidence that crack cocaine is sub­
stantially more harmful than other forms of cocaine). 
92. See USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at v ("Cocaine in any form produces the 
same physiological and psychotropic effects ... but powder cocaine, because it usually 
is snorted, poses a lesser risk of addiction to the typical user than crack cocaine .... 
[T]his difference independently does not appear to warrant the 100-to-1 drug quantity 
ratio."). 
93. Joel Brinkley, Anti-Drug Law: Words, Deeds, Political Expediency, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at A18, available at 1986 WLNR 782195 (Westlaw). 
94. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207­
192. 
95. See id. § 2, 100 Stat. at 3207 to 3207-1. Title I alone contains twenty-one sub­
titles. [d. 
96. [d. § 1002, 100 Stat. at 3207-2 to -4. 
97. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005) (citing PAMELA KORSMEYER & 
DAVID F. MUSTO, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL 60 (2002». Nixon also coined the 
phrase "war on drugs," but there is some disagreement as to when it was first used. See, 
e.g., id. (noting that the term was coined in 1969); Phyllis Goldfarb, Counting the Drug 
War's Female Casualties, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 277, 277 n.3 (2002) ("[T]he war on 
drugs was first declared by President Nixon in 1972."); Jim Bildner & Madeline Drex­
ler, Op-Ed., The Wrong Way to Fight the War on Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 2006, 
at All, available at 2006 WLNR 11153655 (Westlaw) (noting that Nixon's "war on 
drugs" was declared in June 1971). 
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Act of 1970,98 Title II of which was entitled the Controlled Sub­
stances Act.99 The Controlled Substances Act is the source of the 
five schedules currently in use to define federally regulated 
drugS.lOO It also created 21 U.S.c. § 841(a), making it unlawful "to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to man­
ufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."lOl Prior 
to the enactment of the 1986 Act, the Controlled Substances Act 
punished all cocaine violations with "not more than 15 years" of 
imprisonment.102 
In 1982, President Reagan intensified the war, noting, "[d]rugs 
are bad, and we're going after them. As I've said before, we've 
taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle flag. And 
we're going to win the war on drugS."103 By 1984, over four million 
Americans were using cocaine.104 As a result, the Reagan adminis­
tration published the 1984 National Strategy for the Prevention of 
Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking, in which Reagan set a national 
goal "to conquer drug abuse and ensure a safe and productive fu­
ture for our children and our nation."lo5 
98. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. 
99. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
100. Id. § 202, 84 Stat. at 1247 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 812). These 
schedules divide federally controlled substances into five groups for use by reference in 
other sections of the Controlled Substances Act (and later acts). E.g., id. § 303,84 Stat. 
at 1253-55 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 823) ("The Attorney General shall regis­
ter an applicant to manufacture controlled substances in schedule I or II if he deter­
mines that such registration is consistent with the public interest ...."). The Controlled 
Substances Act also gave the Attorney General the ability to add and remove drugs 
from these schedules through administrative rulemaking. Id. § 201, 84 Stat. at 1245-47 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.c. § 811). The revised schedules are published in the 
Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1308 of Title 21. 
101. Controlled Substances Act § 401, 84 Stat. at 1260. 
102. Id. § 401(b)(1)(A), 84 Stat. at 1261. Under the 1986 Act, this scheme was 
changed to provide individualized penalties for different quantities and types of co­
caine. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002,100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 
to -4 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b». In so doing, Congress's goal was to differentiate 
between "serious" and "major" drug traffickers. USSC 2002 REp., supra note 12, at 5-7. 
103. President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug 
Policy (Oct. 2, 1982), in 18 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1250, available at http:// 
www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/19821100282a.htm. 
104. OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY, 1984 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PREVEN­
TION OF DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 3 (1984). 
105. /d. at unnumbered first page. This strategy focused on five elements in or­
der to stop drug distribution and abuse: prevention, law enforcement, international co­
operation, medical treatment, and research. Id. at 7. 
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As noted above, crack cocaine became prevalent in the rnid­
1980s.106 It hit the national scene in 1985,107 and became widely 
popular in inner cities in 1986.108 The media played a large role in 
creating public and congressional awareness of crack.109 The first 
mention of crack cocaine in the media was by the Los Angeles 
Times on November 25, 1984.110 However, a turning point in the 
media's coverage of and the public's response to crack abuse took 
place on June 19, 1986, the day after Len Bias was picked second in 
the NBA draft.1l1 Bias, a University of Maryland basketball star, 
apparently "smoked free-based cocaine in the seconds before he 
collapsed and died" from cocaine-related heart failure. 112 Bias's 
death was a watershed in the media's coverage of crack cocaine, 
and reports about the new drug began increasing exponentially.113 
In the months leading up to the passage of the 1986 Act,114 NBC 
106. BELENKO, supra note 50, at 9 ("Crack cocaine trickled into the American 
consciousness in late 1985, but by early spring 1986 a virtual flood of media attention 
assured that this drug would command close scrutiny by politicians and anti-drug 
crusaders. "). 
107. Fagan & Chin, supra note 71, at 18; cf Jane Gross, A New, Purified Form of 
Cocaine Causes Alarm as Abuse Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1985, at Al, available 
at 1985 WLNR 571924 (Westlaw). 
108. James A. Inciardi, The Crack-Violence Connection Within a Population of 
Hard-Core Adolescent Offenders, in DRUGS AND VIOLENCE, supra note 71, at 92,105. 
Crack cocaine has, however, been available in the United States since the 1970s. See 
William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Pol­
icy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1243 (1996). 
109. USSC 1995 REP., supra note 12, at 121-23. 
110. Id. at 122. Andy Furillo, South-Central Cocaine Sales Explode into $25 
'Rocks', L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1984, pt. II, at 1. It should be noted that this article did 
not use the term "crack" (which had yet to come into common use), but rather referred 
to a cocaine "rock." 1d. 
111. USSC 1995 REP., supra note 12, at 122; see also 132 CONGo REC. 22,668 
(1986) (statement of Rep. George Brown, Jr.) ("The shocking deaths of athletes Len 
Bias and Don Rogers due to cocaine overdoses have publicized the lethal effects of 
. buse . . .. .cocame a ") 
112. Bias Died While Free-Basing, Says Medical Examiner, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 
1986, available at 1986 WLNR 1298125 (Westlaw). It should be pointed out that at the 
trial of the individual accused of selling the drugs to Bias, it was revealed that Bias did 
not smoke crack, but actually spent four hours snorting cocaine hydrochloride. USSC 
1995 REP., supra note 12, at 122-23. However, this is not important to the circum­
stances surrounding the passage of the 1986 Act, as it was widely believed that Bias 
died from crack cocaine through the time of its passage. Id.; see also Spade, supra note 
108, at 1249-51 (summarizing the facts of Bias's death and its effects on the 1986 Act). 
113. A search of Westlaw's "allnews" database for the terms, "crack /5 cocaine" 
for May 1986 reveals thirty-eight results. The same search for July 1986 reveals 205 
results. A search for the same terms for the entire year of 1985 reveals eighteen results, 
and a search of 1986 yields 1702 documents. 
114. The months leading up to the passage of the 1986 Act happened to be the 
same as those leading up to the 1986 national elections. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
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News ran four hundred reports on crack, totaling fifteen hours of 
airtime, and Time Magazine named crack the "Issue of the 
Year."115 
B. Legislative History 
Thanks in large part to media coverage of cocaine in the sec­
ond half of 1986, Congress began to take note of the increasing 
crack cocaine problem. Congressman Robert Garcia noted that "it 
is most important to make our citizens aware of the dangers of 
crack and cocaine."116 Congress began to take action with the in­
troduction of House Joint Resolution 678117 and Senate Resolution 
464, designating October as "Crack/Cocaine Awareness Month."118 
During the Ninety-ninth Congress,119 several bills were introduced 
relating to the control and sentencing of controlled substances, and 
of cocaine and crack in particular .120 
With growing public concern over the national drug problem 
and several bills before Congress, the Subcommittee on Crime of 
the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on August 7, 1986, to 
discuss the problems of drug abuse in the United States.12l On Au­
gust 12, 1986, as a direct result of these hearings, Congressman 
William J. Hughes (the subcommittee's chairman) and Congress­
man Bill McCollum introduced the Narcotics Penalties and En­
forcement Act of 1986 as House Bill 5394.122 This proposed Act 
took what the subcommittee considered the best aspects of the pre­
viously introduced bills, and combined them to form the first com­
prehensive draft of what later became the Narcotics Penalties and 
Enforcement Act of 1986, which is found in Subtitle A of Title I of 
1986 was signed into law on October 27, 1986. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-192; Statement by President Ronald Reagan upon Sign­
ing H.R. 5484, 1986, as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5394 (Oct. 27, 1986). 
115. USSC 1995 REP., supra note 12, at 122. 
116. 132 CONGo REC. 21,227 (1986). 
117. See id. 
118. See id. at 20,551. 
119. This was the Congress spanning from 1985 to 1986. 
120. These included Representative James Traficant's H.R. 994, "the Controlled 
Substances Penalties Act of 1985"; Representative Mario Biaggi's H.R. 2954 "to pro­
vide for more effective criminal penalties for violations involving cocaine [and] freebase 
cocaine"; Representative Joe DioGuardi's H.R. 5112, "the Crack and Cocaine Mean­
ingful Penalties Act"; and Representative Major Owens's H.R. 5195, "the Anti-Cocaine 
Amendments Act of 1986." H.R. REp. No. 99-845, pt. 1, at 11 (1986). 
121. See H.R. 526 and Related Bills-Drug Enforcement: Hearing Before the Sub­
comm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Congo (1986). 
122. H.R. REP. No. 99-845, pt. 1, at 11. 
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the 1986 Act.123 On September 19, 1986, about one month after the 
subcommittee's draft and introduction of House Bill 5394, the full 
House Judiciary Committee issued its version of the bill.124 
While the House judiciary Committee was working on House 
Bill 5394, the Reagan administration was working on its own anti­
drug legislation.125 On September 14, 1986, President and Mrs. 
Reagan announced a new anti-drug initiative intended to (1) ensure 
a drug-free workplace, (2) work toward drug-free schools, (3) pro­
tect the public and provide drug treatment, (4) expand international 
cooperation, (5) strengthen law enforcement, and (6) expand public 
awareness and prevention.126 The next day, the President transmit­
ted the Drug Free America Act of 1986 to Congress,127 much of 
which was eventually passed as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986. The document accompanying the proposed act began with a 
message from the President, declaring his intent to "turn the tide 
against illegal drugS."128 He called it "one of the most important, 
and one of the most critically needed, pieces of legislation that [his] 
Administration ha[ d] proposed."129 
The President's bill contained language remarkably similar to 
both the Judiciary Committee's bill and to what eventually became 
section 1002 of the 1986 Act,130 but it differed in several ways. 
First, the President's version of the bill was less severe in its treat­
ment of "cocaine base," requiring twenty-five grams to trigger the 
five-year mandatory minimum sentence instead of the five grams 
123. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1000,100 Stat. 3207, 
3207-2 to -4. 
124. H.R. REP. No. 99-845, pt. 1. 
125. There is no indication in the legislative history that the administration's bill 
was related to the House Judiciary Committee's. However, the remarkably similar lan­
guage of the two bills leads to the conclusion that President Reagan was working in 
concert with Congress. Compare THE DRUG FREE AMERICA Acr OF 1986: MESSAGE 
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 99-266, at 103-05 (1986), 
with NARCOTICS PENALTIES AND ENFORCEMBNT Acr OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 99-845, 
pt. 1, at 1-3. 
126. Ronald & Nancy Reagan, President and First Lady Address to the Nation on 
the Campaign Against Drug Abuse (Sept. 14, 1986) [hereinafter Address to the Nation] 
(transcript available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/ 
091486a.htm); see also THE DRUG FREE AMERICA Acr OF 1986: MESSAGE FROM THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 99-266, at 9 (preamble to the pro­
posed legislation outlining similar goals). 
127. THE DRUG FREE AMERICA Acr OF 1986: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 99-266. 
128. Id. at 1. 
129. Id. 
130. See id. § 502, at 103-04. 
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eventually chosen.l31 Second, it did not have a two-tiered penalty 
structure, and therefore applied the same maximum and minimum 
sentences to any amount of "cocaine" over five hundred grams, and 
any amount of "cocaine base" over twenty-five grams.132 It did, 
however, use the term "cocaine base," as opposed to the House 
Bill's use of the term "cocaine freebase."133 Additionally, the Presi­
dent's version did not explicitly except "cocaine base" from the def­
inition of cocaine, as did the House Bill.134 
Two weeks after the President introduced his Drug Free 
America Act, a third bill was introduced in the Senate, Senate Bill 
2878, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.135 Unfortunately, because 
the bill that was eventually enacted was House Bill 5484, there is 
little legislative history available on the Senate version prior to its 
introduction on the floor on September 25, 1986.136 However, it is 
the Senate's language that was eventually used in the final version 
of the section 1002 of the 1986 Act.137 With both chambers of Con­
gress and the Reagan administration pushing for new anti-drug leg­
islation, the stage was set for the passage of sweeping controlled 
substance reform. 
C. The Bill Becomes a Law 
On September 11, 1986, a new bill, the Omnibus Drug En­
forcement, Education, and Control Act of 1986, House Bill 5484, 
was read before the House of Representatives for the first time.138 
This omnibus bill combined many earlier bills into one larger, com­
prehensive piece of anti-drug legislation.139 Subtitle C of this bill 
131. Id. § 502(1)(A)(iii), at 103-04. 
132. Id. § 502. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. S. 2878, 99th Congo § 1002 (1986); see also 132 CONGo REC. 26,179 (1986). 
Senate Bill 2878 was very similar to both the President's and the House's proposed bills. 
In addition, the Senate was responsible for the short title, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 
and the use of the term "cocaine base" that were eventually passed. S. 2878, § 1002; see 
United States V. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991). 
136. See S. 2978, at 1 (noting that the Senate Bill was introduced on September 
25, 1986). 
137. Compare S. 2878, § 1002, with Anti-Drug Abuse of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
§ 1002, 100 Stat. 2307, 2307-2 to -4. 
138. 132 CONGo REc. 22,245 (1986). 
139. Compare, e.g., Controlled Substance Analogs Enforcement Act of 1986, S. 
1437, 99th Congo (1985), with Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1201-1204, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-13 
to -14 (these sections of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 are collectively entitled 
"Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986"), and Commercial Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, H.R. 1868, 99th Congo (1986), with Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
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was entitled the Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, 
and was virtually verbatim the Judiciary Committee's Narcotics 
Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, House Bill 5394.140 The 
pertinent portions were also similar to President Reagan's Drug 
Free America Act of 1986. 
However, on September 26, while the House's legislation was 
being considered by the Senate, Senator Bob Dole offered an 
amendment to House Bill 5484, entirely replacing the portions re­
lating to mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine trafficking of­
fenses with those from Senate Bill 2878.141 This amendment was 
the last change made to section 1002, and by the time the omnibus 
bill passed the Senate for the first time on October 6, 1986, it con­
tained the language, penalties, and substance quantities that that 
were eventually enacted into law.142 
Through September and October of 1986, there was substantial 
floor debate in both chambers on House Bill 5484.143 There were 
never any committee hearings or reports144 (other than by the 
House Rules Committee),145 as most portions of House Bill 5484 
were taken from smaller pieces of proposed legislation (such as the 
Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act), on which hearings had 
already been held.146 The Bill went back and forth between the 
§§ 12001-12019,100 Stat. 3207, 3207-170 to -189 (these sections of the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986 are collectively entitled "Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986"). 
140. Note that the Judiciary Committee's version did not come out of committee 
until September 19, eight days after it was read to the House. How the bill made it to 
the House floor before it came out of committee is unclear, but Congress works in 
mysterious ways. 
141. 132 CONGo REC. 26,542 (1986) ("Mr. Dole ... proposed an amendment to 
the bill (H.R. 5484) .. " (The text of [the] amendment ... is identical to the text of the 
Senate drug legislation S. 2878) ...."). It has been argued that because House Bill 5484 
originally used the term "freebase," and was later changed to "cocaine base," Con­
gress's use of the broader term should be evidence that it intended to broaden the 
definition. See Cary, supra note 34, at 551-52. However, because the subtitle was re­
placed in its entirety by an independently-drafted version of the legislation, this argu­
ment appears to have little support. 
142. See 132 CONGo REc. 27,196-97, 27252 (1986). Compare S. 2878 § 1002, with 
Anti-Drug Abuse of 1986 § 2001, 100 Stat. at 3207-2 to -4 (the language is identical). 
143. See, e.g., 132 CONGo REc. 22,433-39, 22,642, 22,641, 26,433-65, 26,429-30, 
29,608-28, 30,229-30 (1986). 
144. USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at 5-6. 
145. See PROVIDING FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 5484, H.R. REP. No. 99­
810 (1986) (report of the House Rules Committee); see also H.R. Res. 541, 99th Congo 
(1986) (rule providing for the consideration of the omnibus bill). 
146. USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at 5-6; see also supra notes 120-123 and 
accompanying text. 
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House and Senate several times,147 but on October 17, 1986, both 
the House and Senate passed House Bill 5484, the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986.148 A few days later, President Ronald Reagan 
signed the bill into law.149 
Congress passed the 1986 Act with great haste. The Subcom­
mittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee introduced the 
Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act, House Bill 5394, on Au­
gust 12, 1986,150 and President Reagan transmitted his Drug Free 
America Act to Congress on September 15, 1986.151 It was only a 
few short months from these events to the signing of the 1986 Act. 
The relevant portions remain entirely unchanged since its passage, 
and the areas dealing with "cocaine" and "cocaine base" of 21 
U.S.c. § 841(b) remain identical to section 1002 of the 1986 Act.152 
The speed with which Congress passed the statute may be at least 
partly responsible for the confusion in the text and the legislative 
history of the ACt.153 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND RELEVANT CASES 
Section 1002 of the 1986 Act leaves the terms "cocaine" and 
"cocaine base" undefined, which has given rise to a split among the 
federal courts of appeals as to the proper definition of those 
terms.154 As noted above, these courts have adopted three differ­
ent holdings as to the definition of "cocaine base" and the appropri­
147. See USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at 5-6. Because no committee substan­
tively discussed the bill, "the legislative history ... is limited primarily to statements 
made by senators and representatives during floor debates." Id. at 6. 
148. See 132 CONGo REC. H11219 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986); 132 CONGo REC. 132 
S16915 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986). 
149. See Statement by President Ronald Reagan Upon Signing H.R. 5484, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5394 (Oct. 27, 1986). 
150. H.R. REP. No. 99-845, pt. 1, at 11 (1986). 
151. THE DRUG FREE AMERICA ACT OF 1986: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 99-266, at 3 (1986). 
152. Compare Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 
3207,3207-2, with 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(1) (2000). 
153. See Peter Kerr, Anatomy of the Drug Issue: How, After Years, It Erupted, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1986, at AI, available at 1986 WLNR 827930 (Westlaw) (noting 
that several members of Congress regretted the speed with which the 1986 Act was 
passed); see 132 CONGo REc. 32,726 (1986) (statement of Rep. Frenzel) (characterizing 
the bill as containing "lack of coordination, incomplete consideration, [and] misunder­
stood compromises"). 
154. While outside the scope of this Note, the 1986 Act's treatment of cocaine 
and "cocaine base" has also been subject to substantive criticism on a number of levels. 
Foremost among these are the assertions that the hundred-to-one ratio is fundamentally 
unjust and illogical, see generally Spade, supra note 108, and that it is racist, see supra 
note 82. See generally Marguerite A. Driessen, Toward a More Realistic Standard for 
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ate resolution of this issue. The First,155 Second,156 Third,157 
Fifth,158 and Tenth159 Circuits define "cocaine base" as any sub­
stance that contains the chemical formula C17H21N04.160 The 
Fourth,161 Sixth,162 Seventh,163 Eighth,l64 and Eleventh 165 Circuits 
hold that the term refers only to crack cocaine. Finally, the Ninth166 
and D.C.167 Circuits use the smokeability test, where "cocaine 
base" means any form of cocaine that can be smoked while retain­
ing its chemically basic formula. 
A. Plain Meaning: "Cocaine Base" Means Basic Cocaine 
As noted above, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Tenth Cir­
cuits all take the approach that any substance that tests positive for 
the chemical formula C17H 21 N04, falls within the definition of "co­
caine base."168 These circuits generally reason that the term "co-
Proving Discriminatory Intent, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 19 (2002) (discussing 
discriminatory effect and equal protection implications of cocaine sentencing policy). 
155. United States v. Medina, 427 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 2005), affd, 219 F. App'x 20 
(1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 06-12032, 2007 WL 1833562 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2007); United 
States v. Richardson, 225 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 
1124, 1133 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam on petition for rehearing); United States v. Perry, 
389 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D.R.I. 2005). 
156. United States v. Palacio, 4 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 
968 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1992), affd, 59 F.3d 1421 (2d Cir. 1995). 
157. United States v. Barbosa (Barbosa 1/), 271 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 
United States v. James, 78 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1996) (leaning in the direction of but not 
explicitly holding that the statutory term "cocaine base" is defined by the chemical 
composition of the substance involved). 
158. United States v. Butler, 988 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1993). 
159. United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir. 1992). 
160. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing C17HZ1 N04 as the 
formula for cocaine and its meaning). 
161. United States v. Settle, No. 95-5799, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3103 (4th Cir. 
Feb. 21, 1997); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 1995). 
162. United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1990). 
163. United States v. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ad­
ams, 125 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 1995). 
164. United States v. Crawford, 83 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 1996). 
165. United States v. Mack, 198 F. App'x 799 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Davis, 864 F. Supp. 1303 
(N.D. Ga. 1994). 
166. United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991). 
167. United States. v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 2004). But see infra note 
191. 
168. United States v. Medina, 427 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 2005), affd, 219 F. App'x 20 
(1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 06-12032,2007 WL 1833562 (U.S. Oct. 1,2007); United 
States v. Barbosa (Barbosa 1/), 271 F.3d 438 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Richard­
son, 225 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Palacio, 4 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Butler, 988 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 
158 (2d Cir. 1992), affd, 59 F.3d 1421 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 
318 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:297 
caine base" is clear on its face, and therefore means anything that is 
both cocaine and a base.169 
An example of a case that falls into this category is United 
States v. Butler.11° On August 1, 1991, Los Angeles Police Depart­
ment narcotics detectives observed a suspicious individual board a 
plane in California bound for Dallas.171 Having been contacted by 
these Los Angeles detectives, the DallaslFort Worth DEA Task 
Force interrogated the individual, Roland Butler, when his plane 
landed in Texas. l72 A DEA officer brought in a dog to sniff 
Butler's luggage, and the dog gave "a positive alert that the gar­
ment bag contained narcotics."173 A later search revealed two sub­
stances in Mr. Butler's bag, both of which tested positive for some 
form of cocaine.174 Mr. Butler was charged with possession of 988.1 
grams of "cocaine" under 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(1)(B) and with pos­
session of 948.4 grams of "cocaine base" under § 841(b)(1)(A).115 
The jury found him guilty of both counts.176 
On appeal, Mr. Butler argued that no evidence was presented 
that the substance he was convicted of possessing in the second 
count was smokeable.177 He also argued that the substance was not 
"rock-like, but was soft, mushy, and a bit wet."178 Essentially, 
Butler's primary argument was that since the substance he was con­
victed of possessing was not crack cocaine, he could not be found 
guilty of possession of "cocaine base."179 The court rejected 
Butler's argument based primarily on the testimony of the chemist 
who had analyzed the substance.180 After outlining the different 
forms of cocaine, this chemist testified that the mushy substance 
found in Mr. Butler's bag would have become crack cocaine if it 
had been given the opportunity to dry.181 The court found that the 
1549 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Lopez-Gil, 695 F.2d 1124, 1133 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(per curiam on petition for rehearing); United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278 
(D.R.1. 2005). 
169. E.g., Barbosa II, 271 F.3d at 467. 
170. Butler, 988 F.2d 537. 
171. Id. at 539. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 539-40. 
175. Id. at 540. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 542. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 542-43. 
181. Id. at 542. 
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meaning of "cocaine base" under § 841(b) did not depend on the 
form or manufacturing process of the substance, but rather its 
chemical properties, and that the substance in Mr. Butler's posses­
sion fit that definition.182 
B. Bright-Line Approach: "Cocaine Base" Means Crack Cocaine 
The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits all 
hold that "cocaine base" is defined as only crack cocaine.183 They 
reason that this definition is more in line with congressional intent 
as evidenced by both the legislative history of the 1986 Act and by 
Congress's subsequent ratification of the 1993 Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines amendment, defining "cocaine base" as crack for the 
purposes of the Guidelines. l84 
A clear-cut example of this holding is found in United States v. 
Edwards .185 Edwards pled guilty to two counts of possession with 
intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.c. 
§ 841(a), but challenged the government's contention that the sub­
stance was "cocaine base," and therefore subject to the ten-year 
mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A).186 At the 
hearing to determine the composition of the substance, the defense 
expert testified that while "the substances were cocaine base in the 
chemical sense ... they did not constitute crack. "187 The trial court 
accepted the defense expert's explanation as fact, but held that "co­
caine base" is not limited only to crack, and consequently sentenced 
Edwards as having been in possession of more than fifty grams of 
"cocaine base."188 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sev­
enth Circuit reversed, holding that "cocaine base" can only mean 
crack cocaine.189 It reasoned that "[i]f any form of cocaine base 
182. Id. at 542-43. 
183. United States v. Mack, 198 F. App'x 799 (11th CiT. 2006); United States v. 
Edwards, 397 F.3d 570 (7th CiT. 2005); United States v. Adams, 125 F.3d 586 (7th CiT. 
1997); United States v. Settle, No. 95-5799, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3103 (4th CiT. Feb. 
21, 1997); United States v. Crawford, 83 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Booker, 70 F.3d 488 (7th CiT. 1995); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Levy, 904 
F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Davis, 864 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
184. USSG, supra note 3, § 2D1.1(c); see also infra Part IV.C (discussing the ef­
fects of the 1993 amendment to the Guidelines). 
185. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570. 
186. Id. at 572. 
187. Id. at 573. 
188. Id.; see also United States v. Edwards, 294 F. Supp. 2d 954 (N.D. Ill. 2003), 
rev'd, 397 F.3d 570 (7th CiT. 2005). 
189. Edwards, 397 F.3d at 575. 
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(not just crack) qualifies for the enhanced penalties in the statute, 
then subsection (iii) swallows subsection (ii), because 'cocaine base' 
(subsection (iii)) is chemically the same as 'cocaine' (subsection 
(ii))."l90 
C. Hybrid Approach: The Smokeability Test 
The third and final approach is that taken by the Ninth and 
D.C. Circuits.l91 These jurisdictions hold that "cocaine base" is any 
substance composed of cocaine that exhibits basic properties and 
can be smoked. Their reasoning is similar to that of the Fourth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, but insists that Con­
gress did not intend to exclude other forms of cocaine that are inex­
pensive and smokeable.192 
The most easily explained example of an applicable case from 
these circuits is that of United States v. Shaw. 193 The trial court 
found that because the government could not distinguish between 
"cocaine" and "cocaine base," the defendants could only be found 
guilty of the lesser included offense of possession with intent to dis­
tribute cocaine.194 On appeal, the court vacated, holding that 
"Congress and the Commission must have intended the term 'co­
caine base' ... to mean cocaine that can be smoked," and re­
manded for a determination of whether the substance in the 
defendants' possession fit that definition.195 
These three cases are but a sampling of those that embody the 
disagreement among the federal circuits regarding the definition of 
"cocaine base" as used in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. While 
190. Id. 
191. United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Shaw, 936 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991). The D.C. Circuit is generally grouped with the Ninth 
Circuit as using the smokeability test and certainly does not take the approach of the 
Second, Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g., Edwards, 397 F.3d at 576 (grouping 
the Ninth and D.C. Circuits together). However, the D.C. Circuit has not been directly 
confronted with the issue. The leading case from that Circuit, United States v. Brisbane, 
367 F.3d 910, dealt with a prosecution that did not meet the burden of proof under 
either the crack test or the smokeability test, so the court of appeals was not required to 
explicitly decide between the two. Id. at 914 ("[W]e need not choose between the two 
options because both lead to the same result. Here the government did not prove that 
the substance distributed was smokeable and it did not prove that it was crack."). 
192. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991); see also infra 
note 301 (quoting Representative Traficant, explaining why price is a consideration). 
193. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412. This case is unusual because it was the government that 
appealed, rather than the defendants. Id. at 413. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 416. 
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the circuit split has existed since the early 1990s,196 the recent 
change in federal sentencing law has altered the way in which 
mandatory minimum sentences must be determined. 
D. The Caveat: BookerlFanfan 
To fully appreciate the issue, it is important to understand the 
recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Booker (Booker/Fan­
fan )197 and its relationship to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides formulas to determine 
the appropriate sentence for a guilty criminal defendant.198 In 
keeping with the spirit of 21 U.S.c. § 841(b), the Guidelines, until 
recently, generally provided that crack cocaine offenses were to be 
punished by the same amount of time in prison as cocaine offenses 
involving one hundred times more controlled substance by 
weight.199 They also explicitly state that '" [c]ocaine base,' for the 
purposes of this guideline, means 'crack."'2oo Until January 2005, 
the Guidelines were mandatory with little room for departure by 
federal judges. However, Booker/Fanfan changed the mandatory 
nature of the Guidelines.201 
Freddie Booker was charged with possession of fifty or more 
grams of "cocaine base" with intent to distribute in violation of 21 
U.S.c. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).202 At a post-trial sentencing hearing, 
the trial judge determined that Mr. Booker's crime merited an in­
196. E.g., United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1133 (1st Cir. 1992) (per 
curiam on petition for rehearing); Shaw, 936 F.2d 412; United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 
1026 (6th Cir. 1990). 
197. United States v. Booker (Booker/Fanian), 543 U.S. 220 (2005). This case has 
been thoroughly analyzed by numerous legal commentators, so only a brief description 
will be given here. For a more detailed discussion, see for example, Symposium, Sen­
tencing and Punishment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 367 (2006). Please note that this case is 
procedurally unrelated to the Seventh Circuit's leading case on the definition of cocaine 
base, United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 1995), (despite the similarity of their 
facts), which is also referenced throughout this Note. As such, the 2005 Supreme Court 
case will be referred to as "Booker/Fanian," as United States v. Fanian was decided in 
the same Supreme Court opinion as United States v. Booker. See Booker/Fanian, 543 
U.S. at 220 n.*. 
198. See generally USSG, supra note 3. 
199. Id. § 2Dl.1(c). But see supra note 12 (discussing recent changes to the 
Guidelines). 
200. Id. § 2Dl.1(c). 
201. Booker/Fanian, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the 
Court in part). 
202. Id. at 227 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). Note that 
despite the nature of the charges against Mr. Booker and their similarity to the fact 
patterns outlined above, see supra Parts IILA-C the definition of "cocaine base" was 
not at issue in Booker/Fanian. 
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creased sentence under the Guidelines based on facts not proven to 
the jury.203 The Supreme Court held under the Sixth Amendment's 
right to a jury trial, that "[a ]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) 
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum 
authorized by the facts established . . . must be admitted by the 
defendant or proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."204 
Thus, because the Guidelines are applied judicially at sentencing 
without the aid of the trier of fact, the Court found that the provi­
sion of 18 U.S.c. § 3553(b)(1), making the Guidelines mandatory, 
was unconstitutional.205 Since this decision, the Guidelines have 
been "effectively advisory,"206 and judges are now free to sentence 
defendants as they see fit, bounded only by a review of the "reason­
ableness" of the sentence.207 
BookerlFanfan has three primary implications for the issue 
under discussion. First, because it makes the Guidelines advisory, 
their definition of "cocaine base" as crack is also advisory and does 
not have the force of law.208 Second, the ruling requires the ques­
tion of whether a substance is "cocaine base" to be presented to a 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). This 
holding is an outgrowth of the Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which reached similar conclu­
sions for states' sentencing practices based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro­
cess Clause. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 313-14. For a more in­
depth discussion of Apprendi, see for example, Symposium, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 241 
(2001). 
205. Booker/Fanfan, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the 
Court in part). 
206. Id. at 246. 
207. Id. at 260-61. The Supreme Court recently reversed a Fourth Circuit deci­
sion, which held that "a sentence that is outside the guidelines range is per se unreason­
able when it is based on a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and 
powder cocaine offenses." United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App'x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 
2006) (per curiam), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). Basing its decision on Booker/Fanfan, 
the Court held that a "judge may consider the disparity between the Guidelines' treat­
ment of crack and powder cocaine offenses" in determining an appropriate sentence. 
Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564. 
208. Booker/Fanfan, 543 U.S. at 245-46 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the 
Court in part). Note however that even prior to Booker/Fanfan, some jurisdictions re­
fused to accept the Guidelines' definition of "cocaine base" for the purposes of deter­
mining mandatory minimum sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Barbosa (Barbosa 
II), 271 F.3d 438, 467 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[W]hile the term 'cocaine base' means only crack 
when a sentence is imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines, 'cocaine base' encom­
passes all forms of cocaine base with the same chemical formula when the mandatory 
minimum sentences under 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(1) are implicated."). 
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jury.209 Finally, because federal judges are now freer to impose 
lower sentences, the statutory minimums are more likely to come 
into play, as the Guidelines generally provide for higher sentences 
than the statutory mandatory minimum.210 
The cases and holdings described above frame the issue: What 
is the definition of "cocaine base" in 21 u.s.c. §841(b)? The differ­
ent definitions of terms in this three-way circuit split cause defend­
ants convicted of the same offense to be sentenced in radically 
different ways based only upon the federal circuit in which the 
crime was committed. The discussion of the different forms of co­
caine and its history and pharmacology211 has laid a foundation, al­
lowing an analysis of the terms used for cocaine in the 1986 Act. 
The discussion of legislative history212 has provided a framework 
for analyzing the intent of Congress in drafting the 1986 Act. Fi­
nally, the summary of the circuit split213 provides the means to de­
termine which courts have the soundest holding. In order to 
resolve this conflict, this Note analyzes the various holdings and ar­
guments in order to demonstrate that a bright-line holding whereby 
"cocaine base" means only crack cocaine makes the most logical 
sense and comports with the intent of Congress. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 punishes possession with 
the intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of "a mixture or 
substance containing a detectable amount of coca leaves, ... co­
209. Booker/Fantan, 543 U.S. at 230-31 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the 
Court in part). To illustrate, possession of six grams of nonbase cocaine with intent to 
distribute carries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison, while six grams of "co­
caine base" carries a maximum penalty of forty years in prison. 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(I) 
(2000). Booker/Fantan requires the trier of fact to decide what type of substance the 
defendant possessed because that determination has the potential to enhance the maxi­
mum sentence. 
210. See generally USSG, supra note 3, § 2D1.1. Absent certain mitigating or 
aggravating factors, the Guidelines generally provide for a sentence approximately 
equaling the mandatory minimum when the offender was in possession of the minimum 
quantity necessary to trigger the minimum. Id. For example, the Guidelines assign a 
person convicted under 21 U.S.c. § 841 with five grams of "cocaine base" or five hun­
dred grams of "cocaine," an offense level of twenty-six, corresponding to a sentencing 
range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months. USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at 10-11. 
"[O]ffenses for quantities above and below the mandatory minimum penalty threshold 
were set accordingly using the same 100-to-l drug quantity ratio." Id. at 11. 
211. Supra Part I. 
212. Supra Part II. 
213. Supra Parts III.A-C. 
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caine, [or] its salts"214 with "a term of imprisonment which may not 
be less than 5 years and not more than 40 years."215 It also pun­
ishes possession with the intent to distribute "5 grams or more of a 
mixture or substance described ... which contains cocaine base,"216 
with the same "term of imprisonment."217 Similarly, possession 
with the intent to distribute five kilograms of a mixture or sub­
stance containing coca leaves, cocaine, or its salts, carries the same 
minimum sentence of ten years incarceration as possession with in­
tent to distribute fifty grams of substance containing "cocaine 
base."218 
The problem with these statutory provisions is that "cocaine" 
and "cocaine base" mean the same thing.219 While the term "co­
caine" may be more inclusive than "cocaine base," the statute de­
lineates different types of cocaine, namely its "salts, optical and 
geometric isomers, ... salts of isomers[,] ecgonine, [and] its deriva­
tives," as separate from cocaine.220 If the courts accept the rule of 
statutory construction that each word in a statute must have a dis­
tinct meaning,221 this list makes it clear that neither the definition of 
"cocaine" nor that of "cocaine base" includes salts, isomers, and so 
forth. Thus, what is meant by the use of two different terms in 
§ 841(b)? 
The issue primarily revolves around the definition of the terms 
in 21 U.S.c. § 841(b), namely, "cocaine," "its salts," and "cocaine 
base." As the table below illustrates, there are four primary ways 
that the federal appellate courts have resolved this question:222 The 
first option is to define "its salts" as cocaine hydrochloride, "co­
caine base" as crack cocaine, and "cocaine" as a catch-all for any­
thing made from a cocaine derivative that the statute may have 
missed, including coca paste. This is the approach taken by the 
214. 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
215. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B). 
216. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
217. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B). 
218. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
219. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
220. 21 U.S.c. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(IV), 841(b)(a)(B)(ii)(IV). This list is all inclu­
sive of the controlled forms cocaine under this section. Id. 
221. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001». 
222. Note that while earlier portions of this Note discuss the three-way circuit 
split, this only refers to the three possible ways in which to define "cocaine base." Of 
the four possible holdings, "cocaine base" is only defined in three ways. See infra 
table 1. 
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Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.223 The sec­
ond possibility is to define "its salts" as cocaine hydrochloride, "co­
caine base" as freebase cocaine, and "cocaine" again as a catch-alL 
This is essentially the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit's 
smokeability test.224 Third, "cocaine" could be defined as powder 
cocaine, and "cocaine base" would be the catch-all term. However, 
this approach leaves the term "its salts" extraneous, because pow­
der cocaine is the most prevalent form of cocaine salt. This is the 
approach taken by the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits.225 Finally, 
"its salts" could be defined as cocaine hydrochloride and "cocaine 
base" as anything containing the basic form of the chemical co­
caine. However, these two definitions are all-inclusive, leaving "co­
caine" to mean essentially nothing. This is the approach taken by 
the First and Tenth Circuits.226 This Note argues that having this 
223. United States v. Crawford, 83 F.3d 964, 965 (8th Cir. 1996) (adopting the 
holding of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488 (11th Cir. 1995)); 
United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[T)he only rational interpreta­
tion that we can give this statute as a whole is to conclude that clause (ii) addresses 
cocaine powder and other forms of cocaine identified therein, except for 'crack' cocaine 
which is expressly separately addressed in clause (iii)."); United States v. Booker, 70 
F.3d 488, 491 n.17, 493 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that cocaine hydrochloride falls into the 
definition of "salts," and "cocaine base" means exclusively crack); United States v. 
Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375, 377-78 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that crack is the only sub­
stance falling into the definition of "cocaine base"); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 
1026, 1033 (6th Cir. 1990) (indicating that crack alone falls into the definition of "co­
caine base"). These circuits, defining "cocaine base" as crack cocaine, are generally less 
explicit with regard to the other terms in the statute. This is likely because the other 
forms of cocaine receive sentences based on similar weight, so there is little cause to 
differentiate between them. See generally 21 U.S.c. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), 
841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2000). 
224. See United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991); supra note 195 and 
accompanying text. Note however that the Ninth and D.C. Circuits' holdings are not 
exactly equivalent to a freebase definition because they include coca paste in their defi­
nition (a non-freebase form of chemically basic cocaine), because it is smokeable. 
United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("In addition to crack, 
[cocaine base) includes in the definition 'traditional' freebase cocaine and cocaine 
paste."); cf BELENKo, supra note 50, at 5 ("[In the early 1980s), there was increasing 
popularity of coca paste smoking ... in South America and the Caribbean."). 
225. United States v. Butler, 988 F.2d 537, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that 
"cocaine hydrochloride" is another term for "cocaine," and that "cocaine base" is any 
substance that exhibits basic properties); United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 161 (2d 
Cir. 1992) ("[T)he chemical formula for cocaine base is C17H21N04; the formula for 
cocaine hydrochloride-a chemical term for cocaine-is C17H21N04HCI." (emphasis ad­
ded)), affd, 59 F.3d 1421 (2d Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Barbosa (Barbosa II), 
271 F.3d 438, 466 (3d Cir. 2001) (adopting the holding and reasoning of the Jackson 
court). 
226. United States v. Robinson, 144 F.3d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 1998) (defining "co­
caine base" as anything with the chemical formula C17H2IN04 and cocaine "salts" as 
cocaine hydrochloride); United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1558 (10th Cir. 1992) 
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single definition for two different terms in a statute is unworkable, 
and thus an incorrect construction of the 1986 Act. It further ar­
gues that the smoke ability test contains valid reasoning, but reaches 
the incorrect result.227 Congress intended the term "cocaine base" 
to mean exclusively crack. Consequently, this is the definition that 
the federal courts should adopt. 
TABLE 1: How THE FEDERAL COURTS DEFINE TERMS IN 
21 U.S.c. § 841(B)(1) 
Cocaine Cocaine Base Cocaine Salts 
4th, 6th, 7th, 8th Coca Paste, Crack Powder Cocaine 
& 11th Circuits Freebase 
Freebase Test Coca Paste Freebase, Powder Cocaine 
(Similar to 9th & Crack 
D.C. Circuits) 
2nd, 3rd & 5th Powder Cocaine Freebase, Crack, Nothing 
Circuits Coca Paste 
1st & 10th Nothing Freebase, Crack, Powder Cocaine 
Circuits Coca Paste 
The most easily understood implication of the issue involves a 
situation where an individual is found in possession of a form of 
cocaine that is neither cocaine hydrochloride nor crack cocaine.228 
However the issue has ramifications in other areas. For example, 
the resolution of the question will determine the evidence that must 
be proven at trial in a "cocaine base" case. If "cocaine base" is 
defined as crack, a prosecutor must prove to the trier of fact beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the substance not only has a particular 
chemical formula, but also that it was manufactured in a particular 
way.229 This creates a problem as to the proof needed at trial, as it 
is very difficult to prove that a substance was manufactured in a 
(noting that "cocaine base" is any substance with the chemical formula C17H21N04, and 
that cocaine hydrochloride is a salt). 
227. Like the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, this Note primarily uses the intent and 
understanding of Congress as the basis of decision. However, these Circuits include 
freebase cocaine and coca paste in their definition of "cocaine base," whereas the thesis 
herein does not. See Brisbane, 367 U.S. at 913-15; Shaw, 936 F.2d at 415-16; see also 
supra note 224 (explaining that the Ninth and D.C. Circuits do not strictly adhere to the 
freebase definition). 
228. See supra text accompanying notes 22-33. 
229. As noted in supra Part LB, crack cocaine is defined in part by its manufac­
turing process. 
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certain way that is unrelated to its chemical properties.230 Addi­
tionally, the issue affects jury instructions and deliberations. It may 
be easier for the average American to understand crack than to un­
derstand "cocaine base." However, it may be more difficult to get 
twelve people to agree that a substance is crack cocaine rather than 
any basic form of cocaine.231 
Having outlined the issue and its implications, the remainder of 
this Part is dedicated to analyzing the language and legislative his­
tory of 21 U.S.c. § 841(b). Subpart A discusses the plain-meaning 
approach and how it both falls short of creating a workable solution 
to the problem, and is inapplicable because of the statute's lack of 
"plain meaning." Subpart B analyzes the history and congressional 
intent behind the statute in order to show that Congress meant for 
"cocaine base" to refer exclusively to crack cocaine. Finally, Sub­
part C further bolsters the proposition that Congress intended this 
result by discussing the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines' defini­
tion of "cocaine base" as crack cocaine. 
A. The Plain-Meaning Approach 
1. Reasoning Behind the Plain-Meaning Approach 
The federal courts holding that "cocaine base" means any form 
of basic cocaine generally purport to base their holdings on the 
"plain language of 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(1)."232 They reason that the 
plain meaning of the term "cocaine base" is any substance that is a 
base and contains cocaine.233 This interpretation, they argue, com­
230. But see Robinson, 144 F.3d at 109 (holding that the testimony of a police 
officer as to his professional opinion that a substance was crack, is sufficient to prove 
that it was, in fact, crack). 
231. It should be noted, however, that there is no question in any federal circuit 
that crack cocaine falls within the definition of "cocaine base" and that powder cocaine 
does not. This general understanding frames minimum requirements for defining the 
terms in § 841(b): "cocaine base" must include crack within its definition and must ex­
clude powder cocaine. 
232. United States v. Barbosa (Barbosa II), 271 F.3d 438, 446 (3d Cir. 2001); see 
also United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1992) ('''cocaine base' has a 
precise definition," which is the chemical formula CJ7H21N04), affd, 59 F.3d 1421 (2d 
Cir. 1995). Arguably, however, the fact that learned federal appellate judges disagree 
as to the definition of terms in the statute, makes its meaning per se not plain. Cf 
Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074, 1080 (S.D. Miss. 1976) (dispar­
ity among reported opinions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act is evidence 
that its language is neither clear nor unambiguous). 
233. E.g., United States v. Medina, 427 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[Section 841] 
regulates exactly what its terms suggest: the possession of any form of 'cocaine base. '''), 
affd, 219 F. App'x 20 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 06-12032, 2007 WL 1833562 (U.S. 
Oct. 1, 2007). 
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ports with the first rule of statutory construction: that Congress 
"says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there,"234 and "where ... the statute's language is plain, 'the sole 
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.' "235 
However, even among the circuits that take the plain-meaning 
approach, there is disagreement as to the definition of terms.236 
The First Circuit, for example, defines cocaine salts as including co­
caine hydrochloride and "cocaine base" as any basic form of co­
caine.237 This combination of definitions leaves "cocaine" 
superfluous. The Second Circuit, on the other hand, defines "co­
caine" to include cocaine hydrochloride.238 By holding that cocaine 
hydrochloride fits into the definition of "cocaine," it merely 
switches the redundancy, making the phrase "its salts" superfluous. 
The Second Circuit's definition of "cocaine" as a layman's term 
for cocaine hydrochloride239 is patently incorrect and illogical: It 
states that "cocaine base" is a scientific term with a particular scien­
tific meaning that should be adopted by the courts; but, the court 
notes only two sentences earlier that Congress used the term "co­
caine" as a colloquialism for a different scientific term: cocaine hy­
drochloride.240 This makes little sense: The scientific community 
defines "cocaine" as an "alkaline"241 substance derived from coca 
leaves with the chemical formula C17H21N04,242 and cocaine hydro­
chloride as a salt with a "slightly bitter taste," taking the form of 
"crystals, granules, or powder," and having a chemical formula of 
234. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). 
235. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Cami­
netti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)); see 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHER­
LAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION § 46:01, at 113-29 (6th ed. 2000) 
(explaining scope and application of the plain meaning rule). 
236. See supra table 1. 
237. E.g., United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 296-97 (D.R.I. 2005). 
238. United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he chemical 
formula for cocaine base is C17H21N04; the formula for cocaine hydrochloride-a chem­
ical term for cocaine-is C17H21 N04HCI." (emphasis added)), affd, 59 F.3d 1421 (2d 
Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Barbosa (Barbosa 1/), 271 F.3d 438, 466 (3d Cir. 
2001) (adopting the holding and reasoning of the Jackson court). 
239. Jackson, 968 F.2d at 161. 
240. ld. at 161-62 ("[T]he formula for cocaine hydrochloride-a chemical term for 
cocaine-is C17H21 N04HCI. ... '[C]ocaine base' has a precise definition in the scientific 
community." (emphasis added)). 
241. Alkaline means basic. WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra note 15, at 54 (defining al­
kaline as "of, relating to, or having the properties of an alkali ... having a pH of more 
than 7 ... see BASIC"); see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
242. THE MERCK INDEX, supra note 51, § 2480, at 429. 
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C17H21N04HCl.243 In other words, the scientific meanings of co­
caine and "cocaine base" are identicaL Therefore, if the argument 
is that the scientific definition of terms should apply, it is very clear 
that the terms are redundant. 
Using either set of definitions causes two of the terms in the 
statute to refer to the same substance, making the statute's meaning 
far from "plain." As noted above, the courts taking the so-called 
"plain-meaning" approach reach a nonsensical conclusion that the 
term "cocaine" has no distinct meaning, or at least the same mean­
ing as either "cocaine base" or "its salts." 
While the plain-meaning rule presumes that a statute will be 
interpreted by the plain meaning of its terms if such an interpreta­
tion is workable, there are exceptions to this rule. Foremost among 
these is the requirement that" 'a statute ought, upon the whole, to 
be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or 
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.' "244 When the 
plain-meaning rule comes into conflict with this canon, it is entirely 
appropriate to consider additional evidence as to the intended 
meaning of the terms.245 "This is because the plain-meaning rule is 
'rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not 
preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.' "246 
Therefore, the fact that the statute makes grammatical sense does 
not preclude the consideration of legislative history and other evi­
243. Id. § 2480, at 430. 
244. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). This principle has been expounded throughout much of U.S. 
history, and is consequently one of the best understood and most important rules in the 
art of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., id.; Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174; Williams v. Tay­
lor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994); Pa. 
Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990); Mackey v. Lanier Collec­
tion Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 
528, 538-39 (1955); Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883); Mkt. Co. v. Hoff­
man, 101 U.S. 1l2, 115 (1879); see also 2A SINGER, supra note 235, § 46:06, at 181-94 
(summarizing this rule and describing its precedent). This rule appears to create a pre­
sumption that Congress does not insert words into statutes simply to confuse the courts 
or to create ambiguities. Thus, it must be assumed that Congress intended each term in 
the statute to have distinct meaning. The definition of "cocaine base" as crack has been 
the only one suggested that would leave the law without redundancy. 
245. Cf 2A SINGER, supra note 235, § 46:07, at 194-97 ("[I]t is clear that if the 
literal import of the text of an act is inconsistent with the legislative meaning or intent, 
or such interpretation leads to absurd results, the words of the statute will be modified 
to agree with the intention of the legislature." (citations omitted)). 
246. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (quoting Boston Sand Co. v. United 
States, 278 U.S. 41,48 (1928)). 
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dence that tend to show that the "plain-meaning" interpretation 
used in the circuits is incorrect. 
2. Plain Meaning Cuts the Other Way 
In addition to containing a superfluous term in the text (when 
a plain-meaning approach is used), § 841(b) is also ambiguous be­
cause the phrase "cocaine base" may have more than one reasona­
ble meaning.247 While the scientific meaning of "cocaine base" may 
be any basic form of cocaine, there is also a widely accepted vernac­
ular definition of "cocaine base," meaning crack. Therefore, there 
is even disagreement as to the plain meaning of the term "cocaine 
base."248 In United States v. Booker, the court noted that "[t]he 
sentencing schemes in § 841(b) ... are widely considered to estab­
lish two tiers of penalties for offenses involving cocaine: higher pen­
alties for 'crack' cocaine and lesser penalties for powder 
cocaine."249 In Edwards v. United States, the Supreme Court noted 
that "[t]he government charged petitioners with violating [21 
U.S.c. §§ 841 and 846] by conspiring to 'possess with intent to dis­
tribute ... mixtures containing' two controlled substances, namely, 
'cocaine ... and cocaine base' (i.e. 'crack')."25o Similarly, in the 
Booker/Fanfan decision, the Supreme Court again noted that 
"[r]espondent ... was charged with possession with intent to dis­
tribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) ."251 These quota­
tions indicate that a majority of the Supreme Court understands the 
term "cocaine base" to mean crack.252 
247. See, e.g., Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Ark. 
2003) ("A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions, or 
where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree 
or be uncertain as to its meaning."); State ex rei. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 
729, 734 (Wis. 1997) ("Statutory language is ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ 
as to its meaning."); 2A SINGER, supra note 235, § 46:06, at 145·46 ("A statute is ambig­
uous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in 
two or more different senses."). 
248. Cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory ofLegal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. 
REV. 317 (1899) (noting that words, be they in a contract, statute, dictionary, etc., gen­
erally have different possible meanings, and that courts must look to external evidence 
to determine the intent of the parties as to the intended meaning). 
249. United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 
250. Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 512-13 (1998) (emphasis added). 
Despite the similarity of facts and origin in the same district court, note that this case is 
procedurally unrelated to United States v. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005), which 
is discussed throughout this Note. 
251. United States v. BookerlFanfan, 543 U.S. 220,227 (2005) (emphasis added). 
252. In neither of these cases was the definition of "cocaine base" an issue before 
the Court, and both of these quotations come from the sections of these opinions 
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Even the U.S. Attorney's Office for Massachusetts, a First Cir­
cuit jurisdiction,253 has defined "cocaine base" as crack, stating in a 
press release that "[o]n August 2, 2006, [defendant] pleaded guilty 
to one count of possession of cocaine base, commonly known as 
'Crack', with intent to distribute."254 In addition, the mainstream 
media generally equates "cocaine base" with crack.255 For example, 
a Springfield, Massachusetts, newspaper stated that "[a] former 
Springfield and Holyoke resident was sentenced Friday at U.S. Dis­
trict Court to 37 months imprisonment and five years of supervised 
release for trafficking in cocaine and cocaine base (crack co­
caine)."256 Similarly, the Associated Press issued a report of an 
Alaskan case where "[a] federal jury has convicted a Fairbanks man 
of possession of cocaine base-also known as crack cocaine-with 
intent to distribute."257 These are just some of the many examples 
of the media's general understanding of the term "cocaine base" as 
being the synonym of crack. 
describing the facts and procedural history of the case. Booker/Fanfan, 543 U.S. at 227; 
Edwards, 523 U.S. at 512-13. Therefore, these statements do not have the force of law 
that would come from a Supreme Court holding. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. 
Comm'r of Corps. and Taxation, 195 N.E.2d 332, 338 (Mass. 1964) (holding that stare 
decisis only applies where the language from a previous court decision is necessary to 
the holding); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 134 (2005) ("For a case to be stare decisis on a 
particular point of law, that issue must have been raised in the action decided by the 
court ...." (citations omitted)}. 
253. The District of Massachusetts is in the First Circuit, which purportedly takes 
the plain-meaning approach. See supra notes 155, 168 and accompanying text. 
254. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for Mass., Brockton Man Sentenced to 
More than 15 Years on Federal Drug Charges, U.S. FED. NEWS, Nov. 17, 2006 (empha­
sis added), available at 2006 WLNR 20181112 (Westlaw). 
255. While a media or vernacular definition does not necessarily equate with a 
legal definition, where a term is not defined in the statute, the popular meaning is often 
used. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (citing Smith v. United States 508 U.S. 
223,228 (1993»; Maillard v. Lawrence, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 251, 261 (1853) ("The popu­
lar or received import of words furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of pub­
lic laws ...."). But see Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 (1974) 
(noting that, absent evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, where a technical 
term is used, it should be given its technical meaning (citing Greenleaf v. Goodrich, 101 
U.S. 278, 284 (l880))). 
256. Cocaine Case, REPUBLICAN (Springfield, Mass.), Nov. 2, 2006, at B3 (empha­
sis added), available at 2006 WLNR 19121645 (Westlaw). 
257. Federal Jury Convicts Fairbanks Man of Crack Cocaine Possession, A.P. 
ALERT (Alaska), Oct. 17,2006 (emphasis added), available at 10/17/06 APALERTAK 
21:32:47 (Westlaw). A Hartford paper similarly reported that "Redding has been con­
victed of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute a detectable amount of co­
caine base (crack cocaine}." Man Gets Prison Term in Federal Drug Case, HARTFORD 
COURANT, June 6, 2006, at B2 (emphasis added), available at 2006 WLNR 9686726 
(Westiaw). 
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Legal literature also takes for granted that "cocaine base" 
means crack, often using the terms interchangeably or noting that 
§ 841(b) creates a sentencing disparity between crack and powder 
cocaine, without mentioning "cocaine base." For example, the 
Western New England Law Review published an article discussing 
the sentencing disparity between powder cocaine and crack co­
caine.258 In another article, William Spade, Jr. indicated that "[t]he 
1986 Act created the federal criminal law distinction between pow­
der cocaine and crack cocaine. "259 These sources show the legal 
community's general understanding that the hundred-to-one quan­
tity ratio applies to powder cocaine and crack cocaine, and that the 
term "cocaine base" in § 841(b) is specifically referring to crack. 
While this vernacular understanding of legal scholars does not 
prove the statutory definition of "cocaine base," it is further evi­
dence of the statute's ambiguity and provides a different plain defi­
nition of "cocaine base" than that used by the "plain-meaning" 
jurisdictions. 
In addition, assuming that Congress did want the higher penal­
ties applied to crack alone, it may have had few choices as to the 
appropriate terminology it could use in the statute. During the 
summer of 1986 when the bill was working its way through Con­
gress, crack cocaine was a relatively new invention, and an even 
newer fad.260 While the term "crack" had been used prior to that 
time, it is unlikely that it was part of the common vernacular. What 
is now known as crack was first mentioned in the media less than 
one year prior to the passage of the 1986 ACt.261 This first mention 
did not use the term "crack" at all, but rather referred to the sub­
stance as a "rock" form of cocaine.262 In June of 1986, while the 
vanous proposed drug-related measures were just starting to be 
258. Jacob Loshin, Beyond the Clash of Disparities: Cocaine Sentencing After 
Booker, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 619 (2007). 
259. Spade, supra note 108, at 1251. These are just two examples of many. E.g., 
Bertrall L. Ross II, Reconciling the Booker Conflict: A Substantive Sixth Amendment in 
a Real Offense Sentencing System, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'y & ETHICS J. 725, 730 
(2006); Briton K. Nelson, Comment, Adding Fuel to the Fire: United States v. Booker 
and the Crack Versus Powder Cocaine Sentencing Disparity, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1161, 
1161 (2006) ("The sentencing structures for crack and powder cocaine have been dra­
matically different since the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 established a 100:1 ratio as 
the penalty differential between the two drugs ...." (citation omitted»; John G. 
Wheatly, Note, United States v. Pho: Defining the Limits of Discretionary Sentencing, 
59 ME. L. REV. 213, 214 (2007). 
260. BELENKO, supra note 50, at 6, 9. 
261. USSC 1995 REP., supra note 12, at 122. 
262. Id.; Furillo, supra note 110. 
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taken up in the House of Representatives, the South Florida Sun­
Sentinel published an article on the dangers of "rock cocaine."263 
Apparently unable to find a suitable name for the substance, the 
author felt the need to define the drug at the beginning of the arti­
cle as being "[k]nown on the street as 'rock,' 'crack,' 'base,' or 
'Roxanne,''' and constantly switched between the terms throughout 
the piece.264 
These articles are but two examples showing confusion as to 
the name of what has become known as crack cocaine. The use of 
the terms "rock," "crack," and "Roxanne" may have been jargon or 
fad. The term "crack" as referring to a form of cocaine was not yet 
a part of the English language,265 and Congress may have merely 
used "cocaine base" as the only reasonable synonym available to 
it.266 
The foregoing demonstrates that the relevant language in sec­
tion 1002 of the 1986 Act is repetitive, ambiguous, or both. As 
such, it is appropriate to look at other evidence to determine what 
the terms mean in the context of the statute.267 The jurisdictions 
taking the "plain-meaning" approach argue that the legislative his­
tory of the 1986 Act shows no intent to limit the meaning of "co­
caine base" to crack.268 However, the history shows that Congress 
was thinking of nothing other than crack cocaine when drafting and 
adopting the language. 
263. Jonathan King, Deadly 'Rock' Cocaine a Lucrative Trade, S. FLA. SUN-SEN· 
TINEL, June 30, 1986, at lB, available at 1986 WLNR 1377825 (Westlaw). 
264. Id. (emphasis added). 
265. Compare WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra note 15, at 527-28 (no definition of 
"crack" as a narcotic), with MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICflONARY 290 
(Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 11 th ed. 2005) (defining crack as "a potent form of co­
caine ... called also crack cocaine"). The Oxford English Dictionary notes that the 
word "crack" as meaning a "crystalline form of cocaine," is a slang term that was first 
used in December of 1985. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1097 (J.A. Simpson & 
E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989) (citing S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 1985, with no further 
bibliographic information given). 
266. Cf United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1033 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating, some­
what sarcastically, "we are not clear whether Levy believes that Congress should have 
defined 'cocaine base' in extensive and definitive chemical notation, or whether it 
should have filled the statute with the slang names of drugs it intended to target, or 
both"). 
267. E.g., Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D. Ala. 1949). 
268. E.g., United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1992) ("While we 
believe that Congress contemplated that 'cocaine base' would include cocaine in the 
form commonly referred to as 'crack' or 'rock' cocaine, Congress neither limited the 
term to that form in the plain language of the statute nor demonstrated an intent to do 
so in the statute's legislative history."), affd, 59 F.3d 1421 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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B. Intent of the Drafters 
Looking for a statement in the Congressional Record to the 
effect of-we intend the clause "cocaine base" to be limited to crack 
cocaine-would be futile.269 This is not because Congress wanted 
to include substances other than crack in the definition, but instead 
is due to the haste with which the bill was passed. Furthermore, it 
was unlikely to have occurred to the members of Congress that "co­
caine base" could include anything other than crack.270 On the 
other hand, the Congressional Record, committee reports, and 
news media quoting members of Congress, are replete with refer­
ences to crack as being the only drug worthy of heightened penal­
ties and control.271 
The circuits holding that "cocaine base" is defined as crack do 
so with an eye toward the intent of Congress at the time of the 
Act's passage in 1986.272 The Seventh Circuit-the jurisdiction with 
the most in-depth appellate case law on the subject-has held re­
peatedly that "Congress intended the enhanced penalties to apply 
to crack cocaine and the lesser penalties to apply to all other forms 
of cocaine."273 In addition, the Seventh Circuit has found that 
while cocaine and "cocaine base" may be the same substance in 
scientific terms, "the legislative history of § 841(b) demonstrates 
that Congress intended the terms to have different meanings."274 If 
it is true that these terms are intended to have different meanings, it 
is necessary to inquire into what those meanings are. 
l. Theories for Determining the Intent of Congress 
Statutes have the force of law because they are drafted and 
adopted by the people's representatives in Congress.275 Therefore, 
they should be applied "in a manner consistent with the expecta­
tions of their authors."276 Common law systems of jurisprudence 
often look to the "intent of the legislature" in attempting to con­
269. However, the statements of Senator Chiles come very close. See infra notes 
305-306 and accompanying text. 
270. Kerr, supra note 153 (noting that several members of Congress regretted the 
speed with which the 1986 Act was passed). 
271. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
272. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1995). 
273. Id.; accord United States v. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 2005). 
274. Booker, 70 F.3d at 492. 
275. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTER­
PRETATION 221-22 (2d ed. 2006). 
276. Id. at 222. 
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strue a statute.277 The task of determining the authors' expecta­
tions is easier said than done: Because intent is a subjective mental 
state of an individual,278 the task of discovering the collective intent 
of 535 individuals in the U.S. Congress would be practically 
impossible.279 
However, lawyers and judges constantly attempt to discover 
this intent, and so, three primary theories of statutory construction 
have developed to probe into congressional intent.28o The first of 
these theories is that of general intent or purposivism.281 The goal 
of this method is to determine the overall purpose of the legislation 
and interpret the language with an eye toward meeting that pur­
pose.282 It asks why the statute was passed and what Congress 
wanted to accomplish by the statute's passage.283 
The second theory is specific intent, or the "legislators' under­
standing of how laws they adopt would be applied to particular 
cases."284 This is essentially an effort to determine the sense within 
Congress as to how the law should and would be applied.285 The 
third and final theory used to interpret the intent of Congress is 
imaginative reconstruction, which attempts to determine "what the 
legislators would have decided had they thought about" the specific 
problem.286 While none of these theories eliminates the need or 
the impossibility of having to get into the heads of legislators, they 
do create a framework to evaluate the evidence of congressional 
intent. 
277. 2A SINGER, supra note 235, § 45:05, at 25-34; see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra 
note 275, at 221. 
278. 2A SINGER, supra note 235, § 45:06, at 35. 
279. Id. (citing Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 869 
(1930)). 
280. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 275, at 221-30. 
281. Id. at 228-30. 
282. Id.; see 2A SINGER, supra note 235, § 45:09, at 49-55; see also In re Falstaff 
Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I. 1994) ("[O]ur primary task in construing a 
statute is to attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies and 
with the obvious purposes of the Legislature, by viewing the statute in light of circum­
stances that motivated its passage." (citations omitted)). 
283. See, e.g., Falstaff Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d at 1050. 
284. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Circumstances of Politics and the Application 
of Statutes, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 558, 564 (2000) (reviewing JEREMY WALDRON, LAW 
AND DISAGREEMENT (1999)). 
285. Id. 
286. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 275, at 222. This theory is more metaphysical 
than the others, as it requires the individual interpreting the statute to inquire how 
Congress would have answered if presented with the specific problem under considera­
tion. Id. 
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In applying any or all of these theories of interpretation, it is 
appropriate to consider "background information about circum­
stances which led to the enactment of a statute, events surrounding 
enactment, and developments pertinent to subsequent operation," 
which may be gleaned from legislative history or "executive, judi­
cial, or nongovernmental sources. "287 In other words, in order to 
determine the intent of Congress in passing a statute, it is proper to 
consider almost any source that can provide guidance on the sub­
ject. Consequently, the history of the 1986 Act must be analyzed in 
order to apply the theories of determining legislative intent. 
2. General Intent 
Every circuit holding that "cocaine base" means exclusively 
crack, reached that conclusion, at least in part, by analyzing the his­
tory of the 1986 Act,288 The legislative history is replete with dis­
cussions of the dangers of crack cocaine,289 with no mention of any 
other drug being worthy of stricter penalties or enforcement.29o 
Before taking a closer look at the Congressional Record, it is 
important to remember and understand the atmosphere in the 
country while the Act was making its way through Congress. Len 
Bias had recently died from what was thought to be a crack over­
dose,291 the news media was covering the crack epidemic with 
vigor,292 and members of Congress were looking toward the No­
vember elections, having done little to curb the drug problem that 
had quickly become a "clear and present danger to America's na­
287. 2A SINGER, supra note 235, § 48:01, at 109-10. 
288. See United States v. Crawford, 83 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 1996) (adopting the 
Seventh Circuit's reasoning and stating that "Congress intended the term cocaine base 
to refer to 'crack"'); United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488, 492-94 (7th Cir. 1995) (ex­
tensive discussion of the 1986 Act's legislative history); United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 
96, 99 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Congress intended ... to penalize more severely violations 
involving crack cocaine."); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026,1033 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(court and defendant conceded that Congress intended "cocaine base" to mean crack); 
cf United States v. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375, 377-78 (11th Cir. 1994) (Congress's 
tacit ratification of 1993 U.S. Sentencing Commission amendment, defining "cocaine 
base" as crack for the purpose of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines shows intent of Congress 
to adopt that definition). 
289. See infra notes 297-305 and accompanying text. 
290. Cf U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Public Hearing on Proposed Guideline Amend­
ments, at 10 (Mar. 22, 1993) (statement of Don Bergerson) ("Congress harbored a real 
intent to punish LSD and virtually all other drugs, other than crack cocaine, in parity 
with one another."). 
291. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text. 
292. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text. 
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tional security."293 "Drug abuse in general, and crack cocaine in 
particular, had become in public opinion and in members' minds a 
problem of overwhelming dimensions. "294 It is therefore no sur­
prise that the Act was rushed through Congress before the new 
year and in time for the 1986 national elections.295 It is also not 
surprising that there are few statements specifically equating "co­
caine base" with crack, as the 1986 Act was passed quickly and in 
an atmosphere where it went without saying that crack was worthy 
of higher regulation and penalties.296 
a. Debate in the House of Representatives 
In the deliberations surrounding the passage of the 1986 Act, 
many members of Congress expressed concern over the dangers of 
the increasing use of crack cocaine, and an understanding that the 
Act would punish crack more harshly than other forms of cocaine. 
For example, Representative Mario Biaggi stated that "[ d]uring the 
last year, our Nation's already severe drug problem has scaled new 
and even more frightening heights, and the reason is crack, the co­
caine-based drug that is killing our kids, and sending violent crime 
statistics sky high."297 This statement indicates, at least to Repre­
sentative Biaggi, that crack cocaine was more troublesome than any 
other drug regulated by the Controlled Substances Act298 or the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 under consideration at the time of his 
statement. 
Similarly, Representative Joseph DioGuardi was even more 
adamant about the dangers of crack and his belief that it required 
higher penalties than any other drug.299 He noted that his constitu­
ents saw the emergence of crack cocaine as an issue of great impor­
tance and in need of greater federal regulation.30o His comments 
are indicative of the general sense within the House of Representa­
293. 132 CONGo REC. 26,436 (1986) (statement of Sen. Paula Hawkins). 
294. USSC 1995 REP., supra note 12, at 121. 
295. As discussed in Part II supra, the Act was introduced in the summer of 1986 
and signed into law at the end of October. The national election was only a few days 
after the bill's enactment. Cf 2 U.S.c. § 7 (2000) ("The Tuesday next after the 1st 
Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the 
election ... of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress ...."). 
296. See, e.g., USSC 1995 REP., supra note 12, at 121-23. 
297. 132 CONGo REC. 22,665 (1986). 
298. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970). 
299. 132 CONGo REC. 22,657 (1986). 
300. Id. Representative DioGuardi stated: 
Mr. Speaker, let there be no mistake about it. this [sic] Nation has a seri­
ous drug problem. And, with the emergence of crack, an inexpensive deadly 
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tives-that the rise in popularity of crack cocaine was the worst 
narcotics epidemic in history, and required swift and severe govern­
ment action.30l 
While these words spoken on the floor of the House of Repre­
sentatives do not specifically address the application or interpreta­
tion of the 1986 Act's provisions dealing with "cocaine base," they 
do show intent among the members to pay particular attention to 
the problems associated with crack cocaine. While they are merely 
the personal understanding and feelings of the individual represent­
atives, they indicate the general sentiment within the House during 
derivative of cocaine that our kids can easily afford, this problem will threaten 
our Nation's future unless we act now. 
If you do not believe that this issue is a serious one, I suggest that you 
speak to my constituents. Recently, I sent a questionnaire to the people of my 
district in Westchester County on the problem of drugs and crack. The peo­
ple's response has been overwhelming and no other issue has sparked as much 
concern and call for Federal action. 
Id. 
301. There were many comments made on the House floor to this effect. For 
example, Representative Benjamin Gilman noted that "drug trafficking ... and abuse 
has infected every city, town, and school district in our Nation and that we are inun­
dated by increasing amounts of heroin, cocaine-and now the newly highly addictive 
crack cocaine." Id. at 22,321. Representative James Traficant stated: 
Cocaine is no longer a drug of the affluent. A new form of freebase cocaine 
called crack is now becoming a major problem in many cities. Crack can be 
obtained for as little as $10 which makes it accessible to anyone. Crack is 
reported by many medical experts to be the most addictive narcotic drug 
known to man. The widespread use of crack in New York City is said by many 
law enforcement officials in that city to have caused a rise in violent crimes last 
year. Most disturbingly, crack is being used by a growing number of school 
children. I am relieved that provisions I coauthored in H.R. 5394 [the Narcot­
ics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986 which was incorporated into the 
1986 Act] to create new stiff penalties for dealing crack as well as stiffer penal­
ties for those who deal drugs to schoolchildren and teens have been included 
in title VI of H.R. 5484. 
Id. at 22,667. Representative John Rowland indicated that "[w]e are finding that young 
people are easily taking up the fad of crack, and we are finding that more and more 
people are getting addicted, especially after the first or second use." Id. at 22,717. In a 
final example, Representative Byron Dorgan expressed his concerns: 
Perhaps even more alarming is the growing popularity of crack or cheap 
cocaine. Because it causes a speedy rush of exhiliration [sic], it may spawn 
addiction in even greater numbers than other forms of cocaine. The director 
of the National Cocaine Hotline refers to crack as ... 'the dealers's [sic] dream 
and the user's nightmare' because of its relatively low cost and quick effect. 
Police report that increased crack use has also engendered increased 
crime in several cities. Users become so deranged from its psychotic effects 
that they may perpetrate brutal crimes. 
Id. at 22,991. 
339 2007] WHAT WAS CONGRESS SMOKING? 
the 1986 Act's deliberations-that crack cocaine was the largest 
problem within the field of narcotics control.3°2 
b. Debate in the Senate 
The Senate also sought to target crack cocaine in particular, 
and the Congressional Record shows the intent of its members to 
punish crack more harshly than other forms of cocaine. For exam­
ple, New York's Senator Daniel Moynihan indicated 
that 80 percent of all the lethal derivative of cocaine, crack, avail­
able in the United States, originates in New York City. It is all 
too apparent that New York City is badly in need of additional 
funding to disrupt the production and distribution of crack and 
other illicit drugs; it is not alone. Stopping cocaine and crack ad­
diction must become a priority for all of us. A civilized society 
cannot ignore these cries for help.303 
Moynihan's sentiments are indicative of the feeling within the Sen­
ate that crack, more than any other drug, was a problem that must 
be addressed by the 1986 Act.304 
In addition, the statements of Senator Lawton Chiles, Jr., go 
the farthest toward indicating congressional intent regarding the 
relevant portions of the 1986 Act. He noted that he was "very 
302. In addition, Representatives Biaggi and DioGuardi had authored bills that 
were eventually incorporated into the 1986 Act, and thus they may be seen as particu­
larly knowledgeable on, and invested in the subject. See supra note 120. 
303. 132 CONGo REc. 26,464 (1986) (citing Mary Thornton, New York Leads in 
'Crack' Use: DEA Says Prevalence Elsewhere Overstated, WASH. POST, Sept. 25,1986, 
at A18). 
304. Senator Moynihan's comments are representative of the general sense within 
the Senate. A small sampling of other statements include the following: 
I wish to point out to my colleagues that the escalation of drug abuse is shown 
not only by the number of this scourge's victims, but may also be measured in 
the potency and availability of today's illicit drugs. The purified form of co­
caine known as "crack," for example, has lead to a number of drug-related 
deaths. 
Id. at 26,463 (statement of Sen. Jacob Hecht). "A new, cheaper-and far more danger­
ous-form of cocaine, called 'crack' or 'rock,' is easier to transport and use." Id. at 
27,173 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy). 
[Clocaine use-perhaps the most dangerous of [marijuana, heroin, and co­
caine] because of its addictive potential-increased by 12 percent nationwide. 
The recent introduction of "crack" cocaine, an even more potent and danger­
ous substance, into the drug market has allowed that percentage to spiral up­
ward. It is estimated that there are 4 to 5 million cocaine users in the country 
and lout of every 6 high school seniors has tried cocaine at least once. The 
majority of cocaine users is turning to this new, more potent form of cocaine, 
which is now widely available in at least 17 of this country's largest cities. 
Id. at 27,185 (statement of Sen. Dale Bumpers). 
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pleased that the Senate bill recognizes crack as a distinct and sepa­
rate drug from cocaine hydrochloride with specified amounts of 5 
grams and 50 grams for enhanced penalties."305 These words also 
come as close as any statement in the Congressional Record to indi­
cating a specific intent to punish crack cocaine more harshly than 
cocaine hydrochloride through the language of § 841(b). He also 
stated that "[w]e are attempting to touch the problem of eradica­
tion in the bill. We have enhanced the penalties for drugs, but espe­
cially for crack cocaine."306 Not only do these statements by 
Senator Chiles show his indignation with the crack epidemic, but 
also imply his understanding that "cocaine base" is equivalent to 
crack cocaine and therefore different from other forms of cocaine. 
The 1986 Act was passed with a "sense of urgency,"307 resulting 
in the passage of a statute "without such normal deliberative 
processes as committee hearings and reports."308 Thus, more spe­
cific statements as to the intent of the Act and the purpose of Con­
gress in its enactment are unavailable. However, the foregoing is 
sufficient to show what the members of Congress were thinking 
when they voted in favor of the enhanced "cocaine base" penal­
ties309 in section 1002 of the 1986 Act-that crack in particular is 
305. Id. at 27,180 (emphasis added). 
306. 	 Id. at 26,435. Senator Chiles went on to say: 
The whole Nation now knows about crack cocaine. They know it can be 
brought for the price of a cassette tape, and make people into slaves. It can 
turn promising young people into robbers and thieves, stealing anything they 
can to get the money to feed their habit. 
This [bill] will help our law enforcement officials by strengthening crimi­
nal penalties for drugs like crack cocaine. This is an absolutely essential first 
first [ sic] step. Current law makes it very difficult to arrest and convict crack 
dealers and traffickers. . .. 
This legislation will provide enhanced penalties for drug offenses. It will 
decrease the amount necessary for the stiffest penalties to apply. Those who 
possess 5.or more grams off] cocaine freebase will be treated as serious offend­
ers. Those apprehended with 50 or more grams of cocaine freebase will be 
treated as major offenders. Such treatment is absolutely essential because of 
the especially lethal characteristics of this form of cocaine. Five grams can 
produce 100 hits of crack. Those who possess such an amount should have the 
book thrown at them. The damage 100 hits can inflict upon users more than 
warrants this treatment. 
Id. at 26,447. 
307. USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at 5. 
308. United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910, 912 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
309. The section under discussion was only one in a bill of 192 pages that went 
from introduction to passage in about three months. See supra note 150 and accompa­
nying text. Consequently, relatively little time was spent discussing this issue. How­
ever, there do not appear to be any statements in the Congressional Record that are 
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dangerous, scary, and unwelcome within the borders of the United 
States. While Congress was obviously concerned with all forms of 
cocaine, and illicit drugs in general, it is clear from the Congres­
sional Record that Congress believed crack alone to be deserving of 
this harsher level of treatment. 
c. Other sources 
In addition to the floor debates, there are several other sources 
that may shed some light on Congress's intent in passing the 1986 
Act. For example, President Reagan stated in a nationally televised 
address that "[t]oday there's a new epidemic: smokeable cocaine, 
otherwise known as crack. It is an explosively destructive and often 
lethal substance which is crushing its users. It is an uncontrolled 
fire."310 Additionally, the explanation of the President's Drug Free 
America Act of 1986, much of which was incorporated into the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,311 noted that the new version of 21 
U.S.c. § 841(b)(1)(A) would have a lower weight threshold for per­
sons trafficking in "crack" than for other drugs.312 While not a leg­
islator, the President was pushing hard for an anti-drug bill.313 
Consequently, it is very likely that his opinion influenced Congress 
in its consideration of the 1986 ACt.314 
Finally, the U.S. Sentencing Commission noted in its 2002 re­
port to Congress that "[i]n 1993, the Commission narrowed the def­
inition [of 'cocaine base'] for purposes of guideline application to 
focus on crack cocaine, which the Commission believed was Con­
gress's primary concern."315 These extrinsic sources simply bolster 
the conclusions drawn from the legislative history: that Congress 
inconsistent with the foregoing. For additional compilations of congressional quota­
tions regarding cocaine and section 1002 of the 1986 Act, see, for example, United 
States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Davis, 864 F. Supp. 
1303, 1307-08 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
310. Address to the Nation, supra note 126. In addition, the New York Times 
reported President Reagan's Attorney General, Edwin Meese III, as having reported to 
Congress that crack was "a 'crisis of epidemic proportions.'" Philip Shenon, 24 Task 
Forces Sought by Meese to Fight Crack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1986, at AlD. 
311. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
312. THE DRUG FREE AMERICA ACT OF 1986: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 99-266, at 115 (1986). 
313. See supra notes 105, 125-129 and accompanying text (describing the Reagan 
Administration's efforts). 
314. Note that the language in his proposed bill was substantially similar to what 
was eventually passed as the 1986 Act. See supra text accompanying notes 130-134. 
315. USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12 at 5, n.17. In addition, the Commission's 
report indicated that 
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was attempting to single out crack cocaine for the harshest 
treatment. 
The passages quoted from the Congressional Record show that 
the legislature's purpose in passing the 1986 Act was to effectuate a 
change in the way that the U.S. government dealt with illicit 
drugs.316 They also show that crack cocaine, in particular, was of 
great concern. From these quoted passages, it is clear that the gen­
eral intent of Congress was to make crack cocaine the priority in the 
war on drugs. Therefore, using a general intent approach, "cocaine 
base" should be defined exclusively as crack cocaine because Con­
gress acted with a purpose to deal more severely with crack than 
other drugs. This is the approach taken by those circuits defining 
"cocaine base" as crack.317 They see the ambiguity in the terms of 
the statute and look to why the clause in question was enacted in 
the first place. There can be little doubt that those sections dealing 
with "cocaine base" in the 1986 Act were included specifically to 
deal with crack cocaine, and therefore, under a general intent ap­
proach, crack is the sole substance to which they should apply. 
3. Specific Intent 
In using the term "cocaine base" in the 1986 Act, the specific 
intent3I8 of Congress was unquestionably to punish crack offenses 
more harshly than offenses involving cocaine hydrochloride.319 
This is evidenced by both the legislative history320 and by the uni­
versal agreement among the federal circuits that crack cocaine falls 
into the definition of "cocaine base."321 However, this does not in­
dicate whether Congress meant the term to apply only to crack. 
Congress may have been motivated by the perceived heightened harmfulness 
of crack cocaine to prescribe mandatory minimum penalties for crack cocaine 
based on the harm such quantities could cause .... 
. . . [T]he legislative history does suggest that Congress concluded that 
crack cocaine was more dangerous than powder cocaine and therefore war­
ranted higher penalties .... 
Id. at 8-9. 
316. See Spade, supra note 108, at 1250-51. 
317. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488, 494 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Con­
gress ... intended 'cocaine base' to mean crack cocaine."); United States v. Fisher, 58 
F.3d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Congress intended ... to penalize more severely violations 
involving crack cocaine. "). 
318. See supra note 284 and accompanying text (describing specific intent). 
319. See supra notes 297-301, 303-306 and accompanying text (statements of 
members of Congress regarding crack cocaine during the deliberation of the 1986 Act). 
320. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
321. See supra note 231 (noting that all circuits agree that crack falls within the 
definition of "cocaine base"). 
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The specific intent on the subject is somewhat murky. The Con­
gressional Record is largely silent as to how Congress envisioned 
the relevant portions of the 1986 Act would be applied to forms of 
cocaine other than powder and crack. Other than the statements of 
President Reagan322 and Senator Chiles323 regarding the Act's 
treatment of crack as distinct from other forms of cocaine, there is 
little indication as to how Congress envisioned the treatment of 
other forms of cocaine under the statute. 
The most that can be gleaned from the Congressional Record 
regarding the specific intent of Congress is that there is no indica­
tion that it meant for the phrase "cocaine base" to apply to any­
thing other than crack. The circuits taking the plain-meaning 
approach use this to justify their holdings, arguing that the explicit 
goal of Congress to deal harshly with crack does not preclude harsh 
treatment of other drugs.324 Despite evidence to the contrary, they 
defend their holding by noting that the meaning of "cocaine base" 
is plain,325 and that because Congress did not explicitly state that 
"cocaine base" was to be defined as exclusively crack, this defini­
tion should not be read into the statute. However, looking merely 
to the specific intent of Congress, these courts disregard the general 
intent of Congress. 
4. Imaginative Reconstruction 
The nature of the imaginative reconstruction approach makes 
an analysis more difficult than determining specific intent. It re­
quires looking at the representatives of the Ninety-ninth Congress's 
collective thinking to see what they would have decided if 
presented with the particular issues raised by the ambiguity in the 
statute.326 If this is the standard, the Ninth Circuit's smoke ability 
test may have the analysis correct. The evidence suggests that if 
presented with a defendant who was discovered to be in possession 
of a basic form of cocaine that was smokeable, widely available, and 
322. See supra notes 310-312 and accompanying text. 
323. See supra notes 305-306 and accompanying text. 
324. See, e.g., United States v. Barbosa (Barbosa II), 271 F.3d 438, 463 (3d Cir. 
2001); United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Congress neither 
limited the term ... in the plain language of the statute nor demonstrated an intent to 
do so in the statute's legislative history."), affd, 59 F.3d 1421 (2d Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1133 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam on petition for 
rehearing). 
325. See supra Part IV.A (discussing indications that the terms of the statute are 
redundant and that "cocaine base" may have more than one acceptable definition). 
326. See supra note 286 (discussing the imaginative reconstruction approach). 
344 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:297 
inexpensive, Congress may have said, yes-we want the higher pen­
alties to apply.327 However, using imaginative reconstruction as the 
sole method of determining congressional intent creates an unwork­
able solution. 
If the imaginative reconstruction of Congress's intent leads to a 
bright-line rule that any smokeable form of cocaine falls within the 
definition of "cocaine base," it results in the same conclusion as the 
"plain-meaning" approach. All forms of basic cocaine are smoke­
able because they do not decompose before they are vaporized.328 
In addition, "it includes in the definition, 'traditional' free base co­
caine, which is neither cheap nor widely available."329 Therefore, 
while the Ninth Circuit justifies its definition on the grounds of the 
intent of Congress, and calls its test by a different name, it reaches 
the same, incorrect conclusion as the circuits taking the "plain­
meaning" approach. 
On the other hand, if imaginative reconstruction leads to the 
conclusion that the definition of "cocaine base" revolves around 
how the substance is intended to be used, it becomes almost impos­
sible to have a definition that carries any precedential weight. It is 
clear that Congress was concerned with crack, primarily because it 
was cheap,330 smokeable,331 widely available,332 and highly addic­
tive.333 It could easily be argued under an imaginative reconstruc­
tion approach, that Congress would ask the questions: What was the 
substance in question going to be used for; why was it in the defen­
dant's possession; and what was the intended method of ingestion? 
In addition, asking these questions would be the only way to avoid 
a bright-line rule that would make another term within the statute 
superfluous. Therefore, this result of the imaginative reconstruc­
327. See infra notes 330-333 (quoting various members of Congress). 
328. Hatsukami & Fischman, supra note 62, at 1582. 
329. United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
330. See, e.g., 132 CONGo REc. 22,657 (1986) (statement of Rep. Joseph 
DioGuardi) ("[W]ith the emergence of crack, an inexpensive deadly derivative of co­
caine that our kids can easily afford, this problem will threaten our Nation's future 
unless we act now."). 
331. See, e.g., id. at 22,717 (statement of Rep. John Rowland) ("[I]t is OK, it is 
socially acceptable, to get involved in marijuana. Now the deadly line has been crossed 
that with the use of the cocaine as crack and you take the perception of smoking mari­
juana and combine those two, we are now lulling our young people into a sense of false 
security."). 
332. See, e.g., id. at 22,667 (statement of Rep. James Traficant) ("Crack can be 
obtained for as little as $10 which makes it accessible to anyone. "). 
333. See, e.g., id. at 22,321 (statement of Rep. Benjamin Gilman) (lamenting the 
emergence of "the newly highly addictive crack cocaine"). 
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tion theory would have the court determine in each case the in­
tended use, price, and manufacturing process. 
This method would require the prosecution in every "cocaine 
base" case to prove that the substance in question was intended to 
be used in a way to satisfy these elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt.334 It would appear that there is no way that Congress could 
have intended to impose such a complicated and practically impos­
sible burden without explicitly making these criteria elements of the 
offense.335 This test would also be so fact-specific that no case 
would be of any value, also creating a problem of inadequate notice 
as to what actions and substances are covered by the enhanced pen­
alties.336 For these reasons, neither the smokeability test nor the 
imaginative reconstruction approach makes logical or practical 
sense. 
The foregoing analysis indicates that the specific intent of Con­
gress in passing section 1002 of the 1986 Act is unclear. An imagi­
native reconstruction approach, while informative, leads either to a 
nonsensical result or to the same incorrect result as the plain-mean­
ing approach. On the other hand, the general intent and purpose of 
Congress was clearly to punish crack cocaine offenses more harshly 
than other controlled substance offenses.337 As such, using the gen­
eral intent analysis-the only acceptable method of interpreting 
legislative history that does not lead to an unworkable result-"co­
caine base" should be defined as exclusively crack cocaine. 
C. The 1993 Amendment to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
In addition to analysis of legislative history to determine the 
intent of Congress, the subsequent actions of the U.S. Sentencing 
334. See supra Part III.D (discussing the implications of BookerIFanfan). 
335. Cf Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990) (regarding career of­
fender law, 18 U.S.c. § 924(e), "[i]f Congress had meant to adopt an approach that 
would require the sentencing court to engage in an elaborate factfinding process," it 
would have explicitly noted this in the statute or legislative history). 
336. See, e.g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) ("[I]t is reasona­
ble that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world 
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the 
warning fair, so far as possible the line should be dear."). The more general formula­
tion of ambiguity in the statute, namely that the circuits are split as to whether "cocaine 
base" means any form of basic cocaine or exclusively crack, may also be seen to violate 
this requirement. However, the courts of appeals have unanimously held that the stat­
ute is not unconstitutionally vague. E.g., United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910, 913 
(D.C. Cir. 2004). 
337. See supra Part IV.B.2 (quoting numerous members of the Ninety-ninth Con­
gress as to their opinions and intentions with regard to crack cocaine). 
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Commission and Congress may also shed some light on the prob­
lem. In 1993, the Sentencing Commission amended the U.S. Sen­
tencing Guidelines, defining "cocaine base" as exclusively crack 
cocaine for the Guidelines' purposes.338 This was done in an effort 
to "focus on crack cocaine, which the Commission believed was 
Congress's primary concern."339 
The procedure for amending the Guidelines gives Congress the 
opportunity to change or reject an amendment proposed by the 
Commission.340 However, if Congress does not reject the amend­
ment within 180 days of the Commission's proposal, the amend­
ment becomes a part of the Guidelines.341 
When the Guidelines amendment was proposed in 1993, Con­
gress did not disapprove.342 Where Congress is presented with a 
particular interpretation of a statute, its failure to change the inter­
pretation is seen as evidence that the administrative interpretation 
is correct.343 Thus, by failing to repudiate the Guidelines amend­
ment, "Congress indicated that it intend[ed] the term 'cocaine base' 
to include only crack cocaine .... There is no reason for [the court] 
to assume that Congress meant for 'cocaine base' to have more 
than one definition. "344 
While the Sentencing Commission is not explicitly charged 
with administering 21 U.S.c. § 841(b), it must interpret and apply 
the criminal sentencing provisions contained within the United 
States Code in order to fulfill its mandate of "establish[ing] sentenc­
338. USSG, supra note 3, § 2Dl.l(c) (" 'Cocaine base,' for the purposes of this 
guideline, means 'crack.' "); Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United 
States Courts, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,148, 27,156 (May 6, 1993) ("This amendment provides 
that, for purposes of the guidelines, 'cocaine base' means 'crack.' . . . Under this 
amendment, forms of cocaine base other than crack (e.g. coca paste ... is a base form of 
cocaine, but it is not crack) will be treated as cocaine."). 
339. USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at 5 n.17. 
340. 28 U.S.c. § 994(p) (2000). 
341. Id. 
342. United States v. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375, 377 (11th Cir. 1994). 
343. 2A SINGER, supra note 235, § 49:10, at 117-20 ("Where action upon a statute 
or practical and contemporaneous interpretation has been called to the legislature's 
attention, there is more reason to regard the failure of the legislature to change the 
interpretation as presumptive evidence of its correctness."); see also Alstate Constr. Co. 
v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 17 (1953) ("We decline to repudiate an administrative interpre­
tation of the Act which Congress refused to repudiate after being repeatedly urged to 
do so."). 
344. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d at 377-78; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 980 
F.2d 1375, 1377 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that the terms in 21 U.S.c. § 841(b) and the 
Sentencing Guidelines are interpreted as being consistent with each other). 
347 2007] WHAT WAS CONGRESS SMOKING? 
ing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system."345 
This is exactly what the Sentencing Commission did when it passed 
the amendments to the Guidelines in 1993,346 defining "cocaine 
base" as crack cocaine.347 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,348 it has consistently held 
that the courts will defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of 
the statutes they administer.349 Therefore, so long as the Commis­
sion's definition of "cocaine base" is reasonable and not inconsis­
tent with the statute's legislative history,35o the courts should then 
be obligated to follow the Commission's interpretation.351 
While the Guidelines' definition only directly applies to the 
Guidelines themselves, it is permissible, and even encouraged, to 
look at other legislative sources to define terms within a statute. 
For example, in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, the Supreme Court 
looked at the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in its attempt to construe a 
term in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.352 It 
did so because the two statutes share a common purpose and be­
cause the language is remarkably similar.353 The purpose of the 
hundred-to-one quantity ratio of cocaine to "cocaine base" for the 
mandatory minimum sentences in the 1986 Act and the ratio in the 
Sentencing Guidelines for the purpose of determining overall sen­
345. The purpose of the U.S. Sentencing Commission is to "establish sentencing 
policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that ... provide certainty 
and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
criminal conduct." 28 U.S.c. § 991(b). 
346. USSG, supra note 3, § 2Dl.1(c). 
347. USSC 2002 REP., supra note 12, at 4 n.17 ("In 1993, the Commission nar­
rowed the definition ... to focus on crack cocaine, which the Commission believed was 
Congress's primary concern."). 
348. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). 
349. E.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 974 (2005); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501-03 (2002); United 
States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 383 (1999); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see 
also United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (applying Chevron defer­
ence to the Sentencing Guidelines). 
350. As discussed supra in Part IV.B.2, the legislative history does appear to sup­
port the Commission's interpretation. 
35l. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
352. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750,755-56 (1979); see also United 
States v. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375, 377 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Oscar Mayer & Co., 
441 U.S. at 755-56). 
353. Oscar Mayer & Co., 441 U.S. at 755-56; see also Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d at 
378 (citing Oscar Mayer & Co., 441 U.S. at 755-56). 
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tence length, also have similar goals and language.354 Thus, the 
same principle should govern this issue as did in Oscar Mayer, and 
the definition of "cocaine base" that was tacitly approved by Con­
gress for the Guidelines should also apply to section 1002 of the 
1986 Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Cocaine has been used as a drug for centuries,355 but only 
within the last few decades has its derivative, crack, been widely 
available.356 In the mid-1980s, a crack panic swept the nation,357 
resulting in the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.358 
Because the 1986 Act was enacted with great haste,359 it has been 
criticized as not being thoroughly thought OUt.360 One Congress­
man noted that "I'm afraid this bill is the legislative equivalent of 
crack.... It yields a short-term high but does long-term damage to 
the system. And it's expensive to boot. "361 Because of the haste 
with which it was passed, the 1986 Act has an ambiguity in section 
1002, wherein the term "cocaine base" is used but not defined.362 
In addition, the legislative history gives no specific reason why this 
term was used in the statute. This has led to a split among the fed­
eral circuits, with some defining "cocaine base" as crack,363 some as 
any form of chemically basic cocaine,364 and a couple of circuits 
using a smoke ability test.365 
354. Compare 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(I)(A)(iii) (2000), and § 841(b)(I)(B)(iii), with 
USSG, supra note 3, § 2Dl.l(c). 
355. GAHLINGER, supra note 13, at 241. 
356. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
357. Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, The Crack Attack: Politics and Media 
in America's Latest Drug Scare, in IMAGES OF ISSUES 115, 115 (Joel Best, ed. 1989) 
(stating "in 1986, American news media and politicians began an extraordinary anti­
drug frenzy," primarily due to the perceived prevalence of crack cocaine). 
358. See supra Part II. 
359. See Kerr, supra note 153 (noting that several members of Congress regretted 
the speed with which the 1986 Act was passed). 
360. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 864 F. Supp. 1303, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 1994) 
("[T]he statutory provisions that are at issue ... were passed with much fanfare and 
little debate ...."); 132 CONGo REC. 32,726 (1986) (statement of Rep. Frenzel) (charac­
terizing the bill as having "lack of coordination, incomplete consideration, [and] misun­
derstood compromises"). 
361. Jacob V. Lamar Jf. et aI., Rolling Out the Big Guns: The First Couple and 
Congress Press the Attack on Drugs, TIME MAG., Sept. 22, 1986, at 25 (quoting Massa­
chusetts Democrat, Barney Frank). 
362. 21 U.S.c. §§ 841(b)(I)(A)(iii), 841(b)(I)(B)(iii) (2000). 
363. See supra Part III.B. 
364. See supra Part lILA. 
365. See supra Part IILC. 
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Defining "cocaine base" as any basic form of cocaine, leaves at 
least one term in the statute redundant and superfluous.366 This is 
because all forms of cocaine, other than those explicitly delineated 
in the statute,367 are chemically basic.368 Therefore, the so-called 
plain-meaning approach violates the rule of statutory construction 
that each word in a statute should have a distinct meaning.369 The 
"smoke ability test," while looking more toward the intent of Con­
gress,370 reaches the same redundant and nonsensical conclusion as 
the plain-meaning jurisdictions.371 
On the other hand, the jurisdictions defining "cocaine base" as 
meaning exclusively crack cocaine, reach their conclusion by look­
ing at the general intent of Congress.372 These circuits see the am­
biguity and potential redundancy within the statute and look to the 
legislative history to resolve the problem.373 This approach makes 
the most sense. Returning to Mr. Barbosa, if the Third Circuit had 
adopted an analysis consistent with the thesis of this Note, the 
mandatory minimum sentence for Mr. Barbosa's crime would have 
been cut in half.374 Defining "cocaine base" as only crack cocaine 
reaches a conclusion that respects the text of the statute, comports 
with the general intent of Congress, and follows the rules and pre­
sumptions of statutory construction. As such, the split among the 
federal circuits should be resolved in favor of a bright-line approach 
defining "cocaine base" as crack cocaine. 
Spencer A. Stone* 
366. See supra notes 217-221 and accompanying text. 
367. 21 U.S.c. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
368. United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 1995). 
369. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001». 
370. E.g., United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1991). 
371. See supra notes 326-328 and accompanying text. 
372. E.g., Booker, 70 F.3d at 493. 
373. Id. 
374. Supra text accompanying notes 22-29. 
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